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ARE MOTHERS HAZARDOUS TO THEIR CHILDREN’S HEALTH?: 
LAW, CULTURE, AND THE FRAMING OF RISK  
Linda C. Fentiman* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the psychosocial processes of risk construction 
and explores how these processes intersect with core principles of Anglo-
American law. It does so by critiquing current cultural and legal 
perceptions that mothers, especially pregnant women, pose a risk to their 
children’s health. The Article’s core argument is that during the last four 
decades, both American society and American law have increasingly 
come to view mothers as a primary source of risk to children. This 
intense focus on the threat of maternal harm ignores significant 
environmental sources of injury, including fathers and other men, as well 
as exposure to toxic chemicals, dangerous social environments, poverty, 
and other multi-factorial contributors to childhood harm. The singular 
focus on mothers as a source of harm to children is scientifically 
unfounded and reflects persistent racial, gender, and class stereotypes. It 
also can lead to poor public policy. Risk that is misunderstood is likely 
to be met with measures that are both misguided and ineffective.   
The Article first explicates the landscape of mothers and risk, 
contrasting common misperceptions with the hard data on children’s 
health. The Article then considers how and why this distorted view has 
arisen, relying on new social science research about risk perception and 
risk communication. Building on that research, the Article examines 
American legal history and theory, casting a wide net in criminal, 
environmental, and tort law to demonstrate how core legal doctrine both 
reflects and reinforces existing sociocultural norms, particularly in the 
areas of mothers’ responsibility for children’s health. The Article urges a 
reengagement with the precautionary principle, based on solid scientific 
evidence, to improve the health of all of America’s children.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article explores the social construction of risk and examines the 
ways in which the law simultaneously reflects and contributes to that 
construction. The Article considers risk broadly conceived and the risk 
of health-related harm to children in particular. Over the last forty years, 
American society and American law have focused increasingly on 
mothers as the primary source of risk to children1 while ignoring many 
significant environmental sources of harm, including fathers and other 
men, exposure to toxic chemicals, dangerous social environments, 
poverty, and other multi-factorial contributors to harm. It appears to be 
no coincidence that this new, essentialist focus on maternal behavior—
what French philosopher Elisabeth Badinter calls the “Assault of 
Naturalism,”—arose just as the feminist movement was taking off and 
increasing numbers of women were seeking not only to work outside the 
home but also to succeed in new spheres of activity.2 From the time of 
1 This preoccupation may have begun with the April 1965 Life Magazine 
publication of the first photo of a developing fetus inside the mother’s womb, in 
which the woman was literally erased. Lennart Nilsson, Drama of Life Before 
Birth, LIFE, Apr. 30, 1965, available at http://life.time.com/culture/drama-of-
life-before-birth-landmark-work-five-decades-later/#1. However, it has 
expanded in recent decades. Cf. Robert Davis, Spinal Surgery in Womb Tests 
Faith, Technology, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 1999, at D7 (showing photo of the 
hand of a twenty-two-week-old fetus reaching outside the womb during fetal 
surgery). 
2 ELISABETH BADINTER, THE CONFLICT: HOW MODERN MOTHERHOOD 
UNDERMINES THE STATUS OF WOMEN 27-31, 60 (Adriana Hunter trans., 2011). 
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Rousseau3 to the current American controversy over whether there is a 
war on women,4 it is clear that focusing on mothers as a source of 
potential harm to their children creates intense pressure for many women 
to cut back or eliminate a life outside the home, even though doing so 
may not produce a concomitant gain for children’s health.5  
But that is not the most troubling aspect of the new spotlight on 
mothers as a source of harm. Most importantly, the singular focus on 
mothers as the creators of risk is dangerous because it diverts attention 
and resources from the many more serious threats of harm to children, 
thereby discouraging actions both to prevent future harm and to impose 
liability for past harms. Particularly in the Internet age, when much of 
the media lacks scientific literacy,6 the likelihood is high that the public 
will seize upon facile explanations of complex scientific phenomena 
rather than seeking fuller, if more complex, explanations.7 Risk that is 
Badinter deplores the emphasis on “[female] biology as the source of all virtue. 
Id.; see also DIANE E. EYER, MOTHER-INFANT BONDING: A SCIENTIFIC FICTION 
9 (1992) (asserting that the “bonding” theory lacked scientific support). 
3 Badinter asserts that the efforts to “persuade women to return to nature . . . 
reverting to fundamental values of which maternal instincts are a cornerstone” 
coincide with a “radical shift” in feminism, biological science, and ecology, in 
which a small but vocal minority of activists has simultaneously embraced 
naturalism as an ideological and practical creed. BADINTER, supra note 2, at 60-
61; see also REBECCA KUKLA, MASS HYSTERIA: MEDICINE, CULTURE, AND 
MOTHERS’ BODIES 30-35 (2005) (citing Jean Jacques Rousseau and his idealized 
view of the “maternal body” as central to Enlightenment thinking and noting 
that Rousseau’s influence persists today). Rousseau asserted that mothers 
nursing their own infants, rather than leaving it to nursemaids, was the 
foundation of family stability, and thus of democratic society. PATRICIA R. 
IVINSKI ET AL., FAREWELL TO THE WET NURSE: ETIENNE AUBRY AND IMAGES OF 
BREAST-FEEDING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 10 (1998). 
4 This controversy was apparent during the 2012 presidential election, with an 
intense debate over whether Republican opposition to the renewal of the 
Violence Against Women Act or opposition to the availability of birth control 
under the Affordable Care Act reflected a larger attack on women’s rights. See, 
e.g., Robert Pear, House Vote Sets Up Battle on Domestic Violence Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 17, 2012, at A19; Brian Stelter, Facing Outcry, Limbaugh 
Apologizes for Attacking Student over Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2012, 
at A18; and Editorial, The Campaign Against Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/opinion/sunday/the-attack-on-
women-is-real.html. 
5 See, e.g., SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: 
THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN 4-
6, 22-24 (2004).  
6 See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Helping Doctors and Patients Make Sense of 
Health Statistics, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 53, 65 (2008) (identifying 
significant rates of “statistical illiteracy” among health and science reporters). 
7 Douglas B. Clark, Evaluating Media-Enhancement and Source Authority on 
the Internet: the Knowledge Integration Environment, 22 INT’L. J. SCI. EDU. 859 
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misunderstood is likely to be met with measures that are both misguided 
and ineffective.  
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I will elucidate the 
current myopic focus on mothers as the source of risk to children’s 
health and contrast common perceptions about the health of America’s 
children with reality. Part II will discuss how and why this distortion has 
arisen, exploring the social science research on risk perception. Part III 
will examine the history and nature of American law, and demonstrate 
how that law both reflects and reinforces existing sociocultural norms. 
Part IV will comment on the implications of Parts II and III and suggest 
how the risks to children’s health should be reframed in order to develop 
more effective measures to minimize harm to children.  
I. MOTHER’S ROLE IN SHAPING CHILDREN’S HEALTH—RHETORIC VS. 
REALITY 
This Article will explore the multiple contributors to children’s 
health. It will demonstrate that the failure to consider multiple sources of 
risk to children means in practice that mothers—rather than others—are 
disproportionately held legally responsible for the protection of their 
children’s health and well-being. Litigation against pregnant women, 
including criminal prosecutions, tort suits, suits to compel medical 
treatment, and child neglect proceedings, is relatively rare. However, 
taken together these proceedings send the message that women must 
conform to narrowly prescribed norms of maternal behavior in order to 
meet their legal, as well as moral, obligations. Popular and legal 
discourse about mothers and children’s risk also frequently includes 
thinly veiled racial and class-based stereotyping about what constitutes a 
good mother.8 In these discussions, other sources of risk—both human 
and environmental—are largely ignored. 
A. THE FOCUS ON MOTHERS 
Today the media, the medical profession, and the government 
articulate a wide array of risks (both direct and indirect) that mothers 
pose to children. Direct risks are seen to arise during pregnancy, and 
many view women as the sole guarantors of fetal health. Doctors, 
mainstream news stories, and popular websites like What to Expect 
When You’re Expecting9 urge women to abstain from the use of all 
drugs, including street drugs, alcohol, nicotine, “unnecessary” 
(2000); cf. Karen Frost et al., Relative Risk in the News Media: A Quantification 
of Misrepresentation, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 842, 843-44 (1997).  
8 See generally, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 938, 938-54 (1997). 
9 The website’s official name is “WHAT TO EXPECT®,” http://www.whattoexpect.
com (last visited Aug. 25, 2012). 
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prescription medications, and sometimes caffeine, in order to provide the 
safest possible space for prenatal development.10 Many physicians and 
health policymakers urge routine testing of all pregnant women for HIV 
(albeit with the opportunity to opt out), on the theory that if women 
discover that they are HIV positive they will choose to take anti-
retroviral drugs (with potential long-term health effects) to reduce the 
risk of transmitting HIV to their children.11 Physicians routinely urge 
women to agree to Caesarian sections if electronic fetal monitoring 
(EFM) points to fetal distress, despite the fact that EFM is an extremely 
poor predictor of actual fetal distress and that Caesarian sections have 
higher rates of maternal and infant death and post-birth complications for 
mother and child than vaginal deliveries.12 When considered in isolation, 
10 See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics, Work Group on Breastfeeding, 
Breastfeeding and the Use of Human Milk, 100 PEDIATRICS 1035, 1035 (1997) 
[hereinafter 1997 AAP Breastfeeding Policy Statement]; American Academy of 
Pediatrics, Section on Breastfeeding, Breastfeeding and the Use of Human Milk, 
129 PEDIATRICS e827, e832-33 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 AAP Breastfeeding 
Policy Statement]; DAN STEINBERG & SHELLY GEHSHAN, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, STATE RESPONSES TO MATERNAL DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE: AN 
UPDATE (2000); Janet R. Hankin, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Prevention Research, 
26 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 58, 58-59 (2002); Steven J. Ondersma et al., 
Prenatal Drug Exposure and Social Policy: The Search for an Appropriate 
Response, 5 CHILD MALTREATMENT 93, 95-97 (2000); Denise Grady, Pregnancy 
Problems Tied to Caffeine: Long-Held Concerns About Miscarriages Are Focus 
of New Study, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at A10. 
11 Bernard M. Branson et al., Revised Recommendations for HIV Testing of 
Adults, Adolescents, and Pregnant Women in Health-Care Settings, MMWR 
RECOMMENDATIONS & REP., Sept. 22, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.g 
ov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5514.pdf. Only about 100 American children are born HIV+ 
each year, due to transmission during pregnancy and birth or breastfeeding, 
compared to about 1300 children twenty years ago. Donald G. McNeil Jr., New 
H.I.V. Cases Remain Steady over a Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2011, at A16; 
Jason Beaubien, Botswana’s ‘Stunning Achievement’ Against AIDS, NPR, July 9, 
2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/07/09/156375781/botswanas-stunning-achiev 
ement-against-aids. 
12 Ken L. Bassett et al., Defensive Medicine During Hospital Obstetrical Care: 
A By-Product of the Technological Age, 51 SOC. SCI. & MED. 523, 530 (2000) 
(citing research showing that electronic fetal monitoring has not proven better 
than nurses using stethoscopes in identifying fetuses at risk of oxygen 
deprivation (“fetal distress”), although it has led to greatly increased rates of 
cesarean section); see also Catherine Deneux-Tharaux et al., Postpartum 
Maternal Mortality and Cesarean Delivery, 108 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
541 (2006). Caesarian section rates have climbed from about 5% in the mid-
1960s to nearly 33% in 2009. See, e.g., Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the 
Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Order Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 
1951, 1955 (1986); Helen I. Marieskind, Cesarean Section in the United States: 
Has It Changed Since 1979?, 16 BIRTH 196, 196 (1989); Joyce A. Martin et al., 
Births: Final Data for 2009, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Nov. 3, 2011, at 1, 1-2, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_01.pdf. 
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each of these efforts to persuade pregnant women to engage in risk-
minimizing behaviors might appear as positive examples of the 
precautionary principle in action,13 or even as evidence of an emerging 
norm of care that prospective mothers should embrace.  
However, these efforts are not simply isolated recommendations 
made by the media, family members, or health care professionals. 
Instead, they provide the foundation for a variety of legal enforcement 
actions. At the “minor” end of the spectrum of legal interventions, more 
than half of the states have laws preventing women’s advance medical 
directives from being carried out when the woman is pregnant.14 At the 
other, clearly “major” end of the spectrum, pregnant women who 
consume both illegal and legal drugs may be criminally prosecuted. In 
addition, many states have enacted laws authorizing the civil 
commitment of drug-using pregnant women. Further, in a number of 
celebrated cases, when women have refused to give informed consent to 
proposed medical interventions, physicians have obtained court orders 
for the women to be hospitalized and to undergo Caesarian sections or 
other medical treatment, all in the name of protecting fetal health.15 
Even normal human activity does not escape legal scrutiny. In 2010, a 
pregnant woman in Iowa was arrested for attempted feticide after she fell 
down the stairs and told emergency room workers that she was not sure 
she wanted to have her baby because her husband had recently 
abandoned her and her two young children.16  
Post-birth, mothers are asserted to threaten even more harm, both 
directly (e.g., by transmitting dangerous substances via breastfeeding)17 
13 See discussion of the precautionary principle in its varying incarnations, infra 
Part III.C. 
14 Amy Lynn Jerdee, Note, Breaking Through the Silence: Minnesota’s 
Pregnancy Presumption and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 971 (2000).  
15 Linda C. Fentiman, The New “Fetal Protection”: The Wrong Answer to the 
Crisis of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 537, 568-69 (2006) (citing cases); see also Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (overturning decision of a trial judge that because a 
woman had failed to follow her physician’s recommendations her pregnancy 
was therefore “high risk” and holding that hospitalization was necessary to 
ensure compliance with the physician’s orders). 
16 The state ultimately decided not to prosecute. John Mangalonzo, Feticide 
Charges Dropped; New Information About Pregnancy Emerges, HAWKEYE, Feb. 
11, 2010, http://www.thehawkeye.com/story/Fetus-death-021110 (explaining 
that prosecutors decided not to pursue the case because the fetus was not old 
enough to be viable). 
17 Worldwide, though not in the United States, breastfeeding accounts for about 
one-seventh of all new HIV infections. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Clinton Aims for 
‘AIDS-Free Generation,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at A16. 
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and indirectly (e.g., by choosing not to breastfeed or by failing to protect 
a child from another’s abuse, especially sexual and physical violence). 
Government intervention is more likely once children are born than 
during pregnancy, reflecting the common law’s drawing of a bright line 
at birth.18 In the first decade of this century, the federal government 
launched a major campaign to encourage new mothers to breastfeed, 
even while resisting changes in employment law to make it more 
reasonable for working women to do so.19 In 2012, New York City 
launched a voluntary program, called “Latch On NYC,” in which all 
participating New York hospitals treat formula as a drug that will only be 
available to new mothers with an approved “medical reason.”20 In 
medical journals and the popular press, women who choose not to 
breastfeed exclusively for six months are portrayed as risking their 
children’s health as well as cognitive and intellectual development,21 
18 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654, 655-61 (Ky. 2004) 
(describing the common law “born alive rule,” which prohibited criminal 
prosecution for homicide in the case of a fetus which was injured in utero and 
not born alive and abrogating it prospectively). Courts in Canada, drawing on 
the same common law tradition, continue to view birth as a bright line, 
precluding both criminal and tort actions based on the actions of the pregnant 
woman or a third party which cause death or injury to a fetus. Regina v. 
Sullivan, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489 (Can.) and Regina v. Drummond, [1996] 143 
D.L.R. 4th 368 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.), and Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 
(Can.).  
19 In 2004, the Bush Administration launched a national advertising campaign 
targeted at first time parents “who would not normally breastfeed their baby.” 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL BREASTFEEDING CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/programs/nbc/index.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2010). Meanwhile, Congress repeatedly rejected proposals to 
accommodate nursing women at work. See, for example, Breastfeeding 
Promotion Act of 2007, H.R. 2236, 110th Cong. §102 (2007), which would have 
amended § 701(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: (1) by inserting “(including 
lactation)” after “childbirth” [as one of the conditions considered a basis for sex 
discrimination under Title VII], and (2) by adding at the end the following: “For 
purposes of this subsection, the term ‘lactation’ means a condition that may 
result in the feeding of a child directly from the breast or the expressing of milk 
from the breast.” This or similar legislation was introduced by Representative 
Carolyn Maloney in every session of Congress since 1998. Not until the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereinafter referred to as the Affordable 
Care Act or ACA) was enacted and signed into law by President Obama in 2010 
did federal law require employers of more than fifty employees to provide 
nursing mothers with private lactation rooms and the ability to take time to 
pump at work. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4207, 124 Stat. 119, 577-78 (2010). 
20 Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, Latch on NYC, 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/ms/initiative-
description.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2012).  
21 See Alissa Quart, The Milk Wars, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, (Sunday 
Opinion), at 9; 2012 AAP Breastfeeding Policy Statement, supra note 10, at 
e828-31.  
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though there is strikingly little data showing that breastfeeding leads to 
the claimed positive health outcomes.22 Many of the studies linking 
breastfeeding with positive health outcomes are equivocal, showing at 
most association rather than causation. In fact, one study purporting to 
find that infants who were formula-fed are more likely to die from 
accidents than breastfed babies (a finding which lacks a plausible 
biological mechanism) acknowledged that the constellation of attributes 
belonging to women who choose to breastfeed, rather than breastfeeding 
itself, may be the true cause of the asserted health benefits.23  
B. THE MALE CONTRIBUTION TO CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
While the government, media, and the medical profession have 
ramped up the focus on mothers as the source of harm to children, most 
popular and professional risk assessments, as well as legal authorities, 
omit any discussion of the very real ways in which fathers can adversely 
affect children’s health and well-being.24 This is not merely an issue of 
gender parity. Men contribute to impaired fetal development through 
workplace exposure to toxic chemicals, which can lead to defective 
sperm, miscarriages, stillbirths, and other negative birth outcomes.25 
Men who smoke while their partners are pregnant pose risks to their 
children’s health; such smoking correlates with stillbirths, low birth 
22 See, e.g., Joan B. Wolf, Is Breast Really Best? Risk and Total Motherhood in 
the National Breastfeeding Awareness Campaign, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
L. 595, 600-01, 615-17, 620-22 (2007) (criticizing the quality of the data on the 
benefits of breastfeeding); see also Amy Tuteur, Weaponizing Breasts, THE 
SKEPTICAL OB (July 15, 2012), http://skepticalob.blogspot.com/2012/07/weapo
nzing-breasts.html (noting that the data on the advantages of breastfeeding are 
weak “and not particularly clinically relevant”).  
23 Linda C. Fentiman, Marketing Mothers’ Milk: The Commodification of 
Breastfeeding and the New Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 
NEV. L.J. 29, 46-49 (2009); see also BADINTER, supra note 2, at 71. 
Nonetheless, public health officials continue to make broad claims about the 
breastfeeding’s benefits for a multitude of childhood and adult illnesses. See, 
e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, State Health Commissioner Cites 
Obesity Prevention, Nutrition Benefits of Breastfeeding (Apr. 8, 2011), 
available at https://www.health.ny.gov/press/releases/2011/2011-04-08_breastf 
eeding_benefits.htm. 
24 An exception is Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. 
L. REV. 955, 996-97 (1984) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s conflation of 
biological differences with responsibility for nurturing children).  
25 In one leading case, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 
U.S. 187 (1991), the Supreme Court held that employers violate Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 when they adopt “fetal protection policies” which 
preclude fertile women, but not fertile men, from working in areas that pose 
potential hazards (such as lead exposure) to fetuses and children. 
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weight, and congenital malformations.26 Fathers also contribute to the 
risk that their children will suffer from autism due to genetic mutations, 
which increase with the father’s age and through epigenetic changes that 
are just beginning to be understood.27 Further, pregnant women have the 
potential to transmit HIV to their newborns, but most of these women 
become HIV positive through their male sexual partners.28 These men 
frequently resist the use of condoms, which would prevent the 
transmission of HIV as well as other sexually transmitted diseases.29  
Most importantly, physical abuse by men is a significant source of 
childhood injury and death. Male sexual and physical abuse of children, 
particularly girls, is a major contributor to their development of physical 
and mental illnesses and substance abuse problems.30 Many of these 
girls later become involved in intimate relationships with a batterer who 
also subjects them to sexual and physical abuse, much as they 
26 Jo Leonardi-Bee et al., Secondhand Smoke and Adverse Fetal Outcomes in 
Nonsmoking Pregnant Women: A Meta-analysis, 127 PEDIATRICS 734 (2011), 
available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/127/4/734.full.pdf 
(analyzing effects of secondhand smoke, including smoke from fathers). 
27 See, e.g., Benedict Carey, Study Finds Risk of Autism Linked to Older 
Fathers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, at A1; Judith Shulevitz, Why Fathers 
Really Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2012, at SR 1; Benjamin M. Neale et al., 
Patterns and Rates of Exonic De Novo Mutations in Autism Spectrum 
Disorders, 485 NATURE 242 (2012); Stephen J. Sanders et al., De Novo 
Mutations Revealed by Whole-Exome Sequencing Are Strongly Associated with 
Autism, 485 NATURE 237 (2012); and Brian J. O’Roak et al., Sporadic Autism 
Exomes Reveal a Highly Interconnected Protein Network of De Novo 
Mutations, 485 NATURE 246 (2012). 
28 According to the CDC, “Most women are infected with HIV through 
heterosexual sex.” CDC, HIV AMONG WOMEN, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/ 
women/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
29 Press Release, N.Y. Academy of Medicine, Study in Academy’s Journal of 
Urban Health Finds Condom Use Lagging in HIV Positive Injection Drug Users 
(Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.nyam.org/news/press-releases/2007/2977.html. 
30 In one study, eighty-four percent of women seeking substance abuse treatment 
had a history of violent assault or PTSD. Susan R. B. Weiss et al., Emerging 
Issues in Gender and Ethnic Differences in Substance Abuse and Treatment, 3 
CURRENT WOMEN’S HEALTH REP. 245, 247 (2003). In a study of twins in the 
general population, women who had experienced sexual abuse as girls were 
three times more likely to become alcohol- or drug-dependent as adults. Patrick 
Zickler, Childhood Sex Abuse Increases Risk for Drug Dependence in Adult 
Women, NIDA NOTES, Apr. 2002 (citing K.S. Kendler et al., Childhood Sexual 
Abuse and Adult Psychiatric and Substance Abuse Disorders in Women: An 
Epidemiological and Co-Twin Control Analysis, 57 ARCHIVES OF GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 953-59 (2000)); see also Lisa Najavits et al., The Link Between 
Substance Abuse and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Women: A Research 
Review, 6 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 273, 274 (1997) (citing rates of PTSD among 
female substance abusers ranging from 30 to 59%). 
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experienced in childhood.31 Although violent crime has decreased 
overall since the mid-1990s, rates of intimate partner violence have 
remained stable since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and rates 
of child abuse continue to be high.32  
C. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN PROTECTING                                          
CHILDREN’S HEALTH—OR NOT 
Historically, the American legal system has maintained a deep 
skepticism about government intervention to protect individual members 
of a family, especially children, from the dangerous actions and 
omissions of an adult family member.33 This skepticism reflects the 
value Americans place on protecting individual liberty, as demonstrated 
by the Framers’ inclusion of an enumerated set of freedoms from 
government action in the Constitution (embodied in the Bill of Rights) or 
31 See, e.g., SHEIGLA MURPHY & MARSHA ROSENBAUM, PREGNANT WOMEN ON 
DRUGS: COMBATING STEREOTYPES AND STIGMA 50-52, 58-61 (1999); Wendy 
Chavkin, Enemy of the Fetus? The Pregnant Drug User and the Pregnancy 
Police, HEALTH/PAC BULL., Winter 1992, at 9 (noting that one study found that 
in a group of 146 female drug users, “over half had been sexually abused. . . . 
There was a clear-cut statistical association among a history of sexual abuse, the 
severity of drug use, and the likelihood that the woman would be involved as an 
adult with a man who coercively urged continued drug use.”); Diane M. 
Morrison et al., Beliefs About Substance Abuse Among Pregnant and Parenting 
Adolescents, 8 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 69, 92 (1998) (discussing how 
boyfriends influence the behavior of teenage pregnant drug users).  
32 SHANNAN CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE, 1993-2010, at 1 (2012) (discussing trends in violence committed by 
current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends, against their partners and 
stating that 80% of the victims of intimate partner violence were female); see 
also ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, FOURTH 
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4) (2009-
10): REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2010) (noting that, using stringent criteria, more 
than 1.25 million children experienced maltreatment during the 2005-06 study 
year, and that approximately 44% of these children suffered physical abuse and 
10-11% suffered sexual abuse).  
33 For many years, the Supreme Court effectively declared an “enforcement-
free” zone around families, leaving parents alone to make decisions about child-
rearing, including instruction in religion and language and civil commitment. 
See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Although all states 
have established child protection systems that seek to prevent child abuse and 
neglect, these systems are frequently criticized for their inadequate funding, 
insufficient vigilance, disproportionate focus on children and families of color, 
and failure to provide necessary supports early enough to prevent parent-child 
separation, particularly among poor families. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There 
Justice in Children’s Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation 
Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112 (1999). 
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by more recent statements by Tea Party activists and others that 
government should not interfere with individual economic activities.34  
The Supreme Court has twice rejected efforts to impose liability on 
the government for failing to intervene to protect children at risk of harm 
from a physically abusive father. In 1989, the Court decided DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.35 In that case, the 
Court held that a government social service agency did not 
unconstitutionally deprive a young child of a protected liberty interest 
when it failed to prevent his father’s severe beatings, even though the 
social service workers had been told repeatedly about the risk of harm.36 
Sixteen years later, the Court decided Gonzales v. Town of Castle Rock.37 
There, the Court held that police did not violate due process when they 
failed to respond to calls to enforce a restraining order against a battering 
husband and father who ultimately murdered his three daughters.38  
In 2012, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
reviewed the merits of Gonzales and determined that the United States 
(representing the Castle Rock Police Department) had violated the 
human rights of Jessica Gonzales (now Lenahan) and her three children 
by failing to act with due diligence to protect them from domestic 
violence.39 Although the Commission’s decision is not directly legally 
enforceable,40 its opinion may affect public policy because it also 
34 The Tea Party Patriots and other Tea Party groups cite freedom from 
government intervention in markets as one of their core principles. See, e.g., 
About Tea Party Patriots, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/
about/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2012); About Us, CITIZENS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIBERTIES: HOME OF THE WAYNE COUNTY TEA PARTY, http://citizensforconstitut
ionalliberties.org/about.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
35 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
36 Id. at 203. Occasionally lower courts have reached different conclusions. See, 
e.g., Anderson v. Neb. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d 732, 738-39 (Neb. 
1995) (affirming a trial court’s determination that when the Department of 
Social Services knew, but failed to disclose, that a potential foster parent had a 
history of sexual and physical abuse, it was negligent and therefore liable for the 
sexual abuse committed by that parent).  
37 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
38 Id. at 766-68. 
39 Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 80/11 (2011). The Commission found that the police department’s 
actions denied the girls and their mother the right to equality before the law, the 
right to judicial protection, and in the case of the three girls, the right to life. Id. 
¶ 5. 
40 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: TEXT 
AND MATERIALS 978, 982-84 (2013). 
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identified systemic failures of American law enforcement authorities, 
including the courts and police.41 
D. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CHILDREN’S HEALTH 
As American courts have limited the government’s obligation to 
protect particular children at risk of harm from human actors, 
particularly violent males, the state has also been slow to protect against 
environmental hazards to children’s health. These dangers are well 
known and include indoor and outdoor air pollution, contaminated 
drinking water, and toys and household utensils that contain hazardous 
materials.42  
Additionally, less visible hazards that lurk in deteriorated housing 
and poor neighborhoods present troubling implications for children’s 
health.43 For example, children who live in dilapidated housing are 
frequently exposed to heavy metals, including lead that causes major 
cognitive and behavioral impairments.44 Poor children often suffer from 
the presence of vermin in living spaces, like cockroaches that may 
41 Id. at 43-44.  
42 For example, controversies have recently emerged over high lead levels found 
in some toys and the concern that infant feeding bottles, water bottles, and other 
household products contain bisphenol A (BPA), an endocrine disrupter which is 
asserted to cause neurological damage and other problems in children. See, e.g., 
Russell T. Gips, To China with Lead: The Hasty Reform of the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 545 (2009); Philip J. Landrigan 
et al., Environmental Justice and the Health of Children, 77 MT. SINAI J. MED. 
178, 183-84 (2010); Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Big Chem, Big Harm?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, (Sunday Review), at 11; U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
BISPHENOL A (BPA): USE IN FOOD CONTACT APPLICATION (2010),  
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm064437.htm (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2013).  
43 ELIZABETH HARRISON ET AL., JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICANTS AND MATERNAL AND CHILD 
HEALTH: AN EMERGING PUBLIC HEALTH CHALLENGE 1-2 (2009), available at 
http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/womens-and-childrens-
health-policy-center/publications/ Environ_Tox_MCH.pdf. 
44 Kim M. Cecil et al., Decreased Brain Volume in Adults with Childhood Lead 
Exposure, 5 PLOS MED. 741 (May 2008), available at http://www.plosmedicine
.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0050112; Deborah W. 
Denno, Considering Lead Poisoning as a Criminal Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 377, 396 (1993); Montrece McNeill Ransom et al., Toward Eradication: 
How Law and Public Health Practices Can Be Used to Prevent Childhood Lead 
Poisoning, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2-7 (2008); Karen Bouffard, Lead Poisoning 
Declines, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 31, 2009, at A3. 
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contribute to asthma.45 They are also likely to live in polluted 
neighborhoods and to be exposed to pesticides used to reduce 
infestations and to toxins brought home by parents and siblings working 
in hazardous jobs.46 Simultaneously, children who live in impoverished 
neighborhoods lack safe places to play and access to affordable and 
healthy food,47 and are exposed to physical danger and psychological 
stress. Some environmental risks are shared by all children, but many 
risks are localized. Children who live near pollution sources such as coal 
burning power plants, inhabit substandard housing, or eat greater-than-
average amounts of locally-caught fish are all at special environmental 
risk.48  
45 Virginia Rauh et al., Deteriorated Housing Contributes to High Cockroach 
Allergen Levels in Inner City Households, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 323 
(2002), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1241179/. 
46 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, TOXIC CHEMICALS AND CHILDREN’S 
HEALTH IN NORTH AMERICA 5 (2006), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/
59/5221_CHE_Toxics_en.pdf. 
47 See, e.g., Michele Ver Ploeg et al., Mapping Food Deserts in the United 
States, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-
waves/2011-december/data-feature-mapping-food-deserts-in-the-us.aspx. 
48 Coal-fired power plants are the largest single source of mercury emissions. 
EPA, 2005 NATIONAL EMISSIONS INVENTORY DATA & DOCUMENTATION (2005), 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2005inventory.html; see also 77 Fed. Reg. 
71,329 (Nov. 30, 2012). In a 2005 study the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) found that power plants account for about 50% of total U.S. manmade 
mercury emissions. EPA, supra. Other large sources are industrial boilers (about 
7% of U.S. mercury emissions), burning hazardous waste (about 4%), and 
electric arc furnaces used in steelmaking (also about 7%). Id. EPA estimated that 
about one quarter of U.S. emissions from coal-burning power plants are 
deposited within the contiguous U.S. and the remainder enters the global cycle. 
Id. Similarly, a large proportion of the mercury emissions to which American 
children are exposed come from other nations, particularly China. EPA, 
Mercury Emissions: The Global Context, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS,  
http://www.epa.gov/international/toxics/mercury/mercury_context.html (last 
accessed Jan. 3, 2014). Burning municipal waste and medical waste was once a 
larger source of emissions, “but as a result of EPA and state regulations and 
reductions in mercury use, emissions from these sources have declined 85-90 
percent.” See EPA, What Are the Biggest Sources of Mercury Air Emissions in 
the U.S.?, FREQUENT QUESTIONS, http://publicaccess.supportportal.com/link/ 
portal/23002/23012/Article/21198/What-are-the-biggest-sources-of-mercury-
air-emissions-in-the-U-S (last accessed Jan. 3, 2014); see also Pamela D. 
Harvey & C. Mark Smith, The Mercury’s Falling: The Massachusetts Approach 
to Reducing Mercury in the Environment, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 245, 263-67 
(2004). Children living in substandard housing disproportionately suffer the 
effects of lead poisoning. See, e.g., Ransom et al., supra note 44, at 7-8. 
Children who live in agricultural communities are frequently exposed to 
pesticides through the air, soil, and water in which they play, as well as through 
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E. THE HEALTH OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN, COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING 
Despite heightened concern about children’s health today, America’s 
youth are quite healthy, viewed in historical context.49 The life 
expectancy rate for children born in the United States has never been 
better.50 In contrast, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
likelihood that a child born in America would die due to illness or injury 
was quite high. One-fifth of all children died before the age of five, 
many before their first birthday. Even at mid-century, the risk of a child 
dying from an epidemic disease was alarmingly real. In the year 1950 
alone, more than 4000 Americans died from diseases that are now 
preventable by vaccines.51 Today, the risk of childhood death in the 
United States is low. This achievement is the result of a combination of 
factors, including basic sanitary interventions,52 the enactment of child 
their parents’ workplace exposure, which is compounded when they bring 
clothing and tools home from work. HARRISON ET AL., supra note 43, at 2-4. 
49 American children are, however, less healthy (on average) than their peers in 
other developed nations. See data discussed infra note 59.  
50 Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2009, NAT’L 
VITAL STAT. REP., MAR. 16, 2011, at 1, 3, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs 
/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_04.pdf (noting that a baby born in 2009 can expect to 
live 78.2 years, the longest life expectancy for American children ever 
projected). Indeed, rather than children facing significant risks of disease and 
death, today most Americans die from diseases developed in response to 
environmental risk sources, including tobacco, diet and inactivity, and alcohol, 
leading to death from cardiovascular disease, cancer, stroke, and chronic lung 
disease. These causes of death are followed in much lower numbers by 
microbial and toxic agents, motor vehicles and firearms, risky sexual behavior, 
and illegal drug use. However, poverty and low educational attainment are 
strong predictors of earlier mortality and higher disease incidence. Ali H. 
Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291 JAMA 
1238 (2004).  
51 CDC, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION OF VACCINE-PREVENTABLE DISEASES 
G-1, G-3, G-7 (William Atkinson et al. eds., 12th ed. 2011) [hereinafter CDC 
VACCINE TEXTBOOK]. Some readers will recall firsthand the fear of polio in the 
1940s and 50s, or, after reading Philip Roth’s compelling account of a fictional 
polio epidemic in his novel Nemesis, have a sense of the way in which fear of 
this devastating disease animated the public’s imagination. PHILIP ROTH, 
NEMESIS (2010). Similarly, during the 1940s, before a vaccine against pertussis 
became available, there were more than 200,000 cases of pertussis each year. 
CDC VACCINE TEXTBOOK, supra, at 215. See generally Donald G. McNeil, Jr., 
Sharp Drop Seen in Deaths from Ills Fought by Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2007, at A18.  
52 These include milk pasteurization, sewage treatment, and a clean public water 
supply. CDC, Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999: Healthier Mothers 
and Babies, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 849 (1999) [hereinafter 
Achievements in Public Health]. 
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labor laws,53 the discovery of antibiotics, the development of effective 
treatment for some childhood cancers, and the development of vaccines 
for almost all childhood illnesses.54 A recent study found that for nine of 
thirteen diseases now preventable by vaccination, death rates fell by 
more than ninety percent from their twentieth-century heights.55  
Compared to the beginning and middle of the twentieth century, 
Americans now have fewer children and give birth to them later.56 
Today, most parents expect that their children will survive to attain a 
healthy adulthood. It is simply no longer accepted that some children 
53 Notably, some of these early public health innovations are attributable to 
women’s activism. Grant Miller, Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, 
and Child Survival in American History, 123 Q. J. ECON. 1287, 1288-91 (2008) 
(noting that the enactment of legislation aimed at protecting children’s health 
and welfare can be directly connected to women attaining the right to vote at the 
state and federal level). 
54 Widespread use of antimicrobial agents such as sulfonamide and penicillin 
contributed to significant declines in infant mortality from 1930 to 1949. 
Achievements in Public Health, supra note 52. Despite a continuing trend of an 
increased incidence in childhood cancer, mortality rates declined 1.3% from 
2004 to 2008. CDC, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATION ON THE STATUS OF 
CANCER (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/Features/dsCancerAnnualRep
ort/. 
55 Kochanek et al., supra note 50 (noting that a baby born in 2009 can expect to 
live 78.2 years, the longest life expectancy for American children ever 
projected). For smallpox, diphtheria, and polio the reduction in mortality was 
100%. For four other diseases, for which vaccination was developed much more 
recently—hepatitis A and B, invasive pneumococcal disease, and varicella—the 
decline was less than 90%. Id. Infants are still at the greatest risk for most 
vaccine preventable illnesses, because they cannot yet be fully immunized, 
although the elderly are more likely to die than any other age group from 
complications of influenza. See CDC VACCINE TEXTBOOK, supra note 51, at 
154-55, 217 (noting the mortality statistics from influenza and pertussis, 
respectively).  
56 Susan Saulny, U.S. Birthrate Dips as Hispanic Pregnancies Fall, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 2013, at A1; Nicholas Bakalar, Pregnancy Rates Sink over Last 20 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at D7. 
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will die or develop debilitating diseases.57 Therefore, parents want to do 
everything possible to minimize the risk of childhood death or illness.58  
Of course, the historical perspective is not the only one available. In 
comparison to many developed countries, including peers in the 
European Union and other Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) nations, the United States falls woefully short in 
measures of children’s health, particularly in the areas of infant 
mortality, preterm birth, and childhood injury and death.59 These 
differences are largely attributable to significant racial and economic 
disparities in health care access in the United States, which carry health 
consequences for children and adults.60 Although the Affordable Care 
57 The leading causes of death for American infants are congenital anomalies, 
preterm delivery, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), and complications of 
the mother’s pregnancy. For older children, accidents (related primarily to guns, 
motor vehicles, and play) are the largest single cause of death, followed by 
homicide, cancer, suicide, and congenital anomalies. Kochanek et al., supra 
note 50, at 6, 29-30. Increasingly, sophisticated prenatal genetic testing permits 
prospective parents to screen for life-threatening illnesses, with abortion as a 
possible response to genetic abnormalities. Cf. Andrew Pollack, Clinical Trial Is 
Favorable for a Prenatal Gene Test, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2012, at B1.  
58 It is probably not an accident that the logo for the National Vaccine 
Information Center (NVIC), one of the leading anti-vaccine groups, represents a 
stylized mother comforting (or protecting) a child held in her arms. See 
NATIONAL VACCINE INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.nvic.org (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2011). 
59 In 2011, the infant mortality rate in the United States was 6.2 deaths per 1000 
live births, nearly three times the rate in Iceland (2.2), the top performer, and is 
higher than twenty-eight other nations including the Slovak Republic (5.7) and 
Estonia (3.3). OECD, Health: Key Tables from OECD–Infant Mortality, No. 9, 
OECD ILIBRARY (2012), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-
health/infant-mortality-2012-1_inf-mort-table-2012-1-en. In 2010, nearly 12 out 
of every 100 babies was born prematurely, a rate higher than nearly every 
European nation, Russia, China, Mexico, most of South America, and most of 
North Africa. WORLD HEALTH ORG., BORN TOO SOON: THE GLOBAL ACTION 
REPORT ON PRETERM BIRTH, 3, 12 (2012) available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/ 
publications/2012/9789241503433_eng.pdf.  
60 See, e.g., David Satcher, Commentary: Our Commitment to Eliminate Racial 
and Ethnic Health Disparities, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2001) 
(documenting widespread racial and ethnic disparities in health care access and 
outcomes); Rick Mayes & Thomas R. Oliver, Chronic Disease and the Shifting 
Focus of Public Health: Is Prevention Still a Political Lightweight?, 37 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 180, 182 (2012). Studies have also shown a strong 
correlation between childhood stressors, such as physical and sexual abuse, 
domestic violence, parental alcoholism and mental illness, and the incidence of 
many adult health problems. Many of these stressors are closely correlated with 
poverty and inner city or rural isolation. Vincent J. Felitti, Relationship of 
Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of 
Death in Adults, 14 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 245, 251 (1998). Children who 
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Act has the potential to reduce these disparities, class- and race-based 
differences in health care outcomes are likely to persist for some time.61 
Having offered this overview of children’s health in America, I now 
turn to two areas of inquiry. The first deals with the social and 
psychological processes involved in risk construction—how we perceive 
risk and how we communicate about it, whether as individuals, 
journalists, medical and scientific experts, advocates, or policymakers. 
The second inquiry asks how this process of risk construction intersects 
with the law and the legal system, particularly with jurors and other 
triers of fact. Here, I will focus on the way that the law “manages” risk 
through theories of legal liability and precautionary regulation. I will 
also explore the tendency of American law to focus on single human 
actors, rather than diffuse or multiple causal contributors. Taken 
together, these larger legal and societal phenomena make it more likely 
that mothers, rather than others, will be held accountable for harm to 
children.  
II. THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 
A. RISK PERCEPTION 
Like beauty, risk is in the eye of the beholder. For scientists and 
lawyers who work at the intersection of science and health (and perhaps 
to some members of the public), it is tempting to believe that risk can be 
assessed objectively. We would like to believe that there is a single 
number—like three in a million—that represents the risk of injury or 
death from a particular type of danger, easily derived by multiplying the 
potential magnitude of a particular harm with the probability that it will 
occur.62 To be sure, quantitative approaches exist and can be useful for 
assessing and managing risk, but their apparent objectivity may be 
misleading. For example, in considering the potential harm from 
exposure to a toxic chemical, a quantitative risk assessment will take into 
account what is known about the dose-response relationship, the route 
and duration of the exposure, the variability in human response to that 
depend on Medicaid, the primary insurer of poor and low income children, are 
less likely to receive necessary services in a timely fashion. Tara Parker-Pope, 
For Children on Medicaid, the Doctor Is Out, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at 
A24. The Medicaid program is always a target of cuts in tough economic times. 
See, e.g., Robert Pear, Medicaid Benefits Dropping for Millions of Patients, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A24. 
61 See, e.g., Joel Teitelbaum et al., Translating Rights into Access: Language 
Access and the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 348, 373 (2012). 
62 Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual 
Framework, in PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 232 (2000). This 
approach has been criticized for not taking into account other values that are 
important but harder to quantify. Id. at 234. 
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chemical, what is known about the mechanism of toxicity, 
carcinogenicity, etc., and the uncertainty involved with each of these 
variables.63 To this already complex equation must be added highly 
subjective factors—how large a margin of safety is necessary to protect 
vulnerable populations (children, the elderly, and those with a genetic 
susceptibility to a particular toxin), what data points should be selected 
for analysis, how reliable animal models are for determining human 
health, and the fact that in real life, exposure is never limited to a single 
chemical.64 Each variable added, and step taken, to develop a potentially 
more accurate analytical model involves subjective value judgments that 
influence how great a risk is found.65  
In addition, many “hard” scientists and social scientists have 
observed that risk, or the perception of it, is not a quantifiable, 
scientifically discoverable fact.66 As Paul Slovic, a leading researcher on 
the psychological and social construction of risk, has stated, “risk does 
not exist ‘out there,’ . . . waiting to be measured.”67 Rather, for scientists 
as well as lay people, the identification and construction of risk is a 
highly subjective process, strongly influenced by one’s gender, race, 
social class, individual psychological and cultural values, and 
unconscious affective and cognitive processes.68 Thus, “[w]hoever 
controls the definition of risk controls the . . . solution to the problem at 
hand. [The way one frames risk is outcome determinative.] Defining risk 
is thus an exercise in power.”69  
Many researchers have documented “the white male effect,” a 
finding that about thirty percent of all white men perceive very little risk 
63 Alison C. Cullen & Mitchell J. Small, Uncertain Risk: The Role and Limits of 
Quantitative Assessment, in RISK ANALYSIS AND SOCIETY: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY CHARACTERIZATION OF THE FIELD 163, 163-67 (Timothy 
McDaniels & Mitchell J. Small eds., 2004). Uncertainty and variability are two 
distinct concepts. “‘Uncertainty forces decision makers to judge how probable it 
is that risks will be overestimated or underestimated for every member of the 
exposed population, whereas variability forces them to cope with the certainty 
that different individuals will be subjected to risks both above and below any 
reference point one chooses.’” Id. at 165. In addition, “dose-response 
uncertainty is often the largest and most important source of error in an 
integrated health risk assessment.” Id. at 167.  
64 Id. at 165-67, 172-73.  
65 Id. at 172-74. 
66 SLOVIC, supra note 62, at xxxvi.  
67 Id.  
68 Risk assessment is highly complex, encompassing both objective and 
subjective aspects, and varies depending on the factors noted. Id. at xxix-xxxvi; 
Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-
Assessment Battlefield, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 689 (1999).  
69 SLOVIC, supra note 62, at xxxvi.  
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in a broad array of potential hazards, ranging from vaccination to lead 
paint to nuclear power plants to handguns.70 White women and African-
Americans of both genders perceive much greater risk in the same lists 
of potential hazards.71 Researchers have considered—and rejected—
multiple explanations for “the white male effect.” They have found that 
people’s perception of risk does not seem to depend on their level of 
education, income, or scientific literacy; nor does it reflect their status as 
caregivers.72  
However, many scholars have concluded that “the white male effect” 
is simply the most striking example of a larger socio-psychological 
phenomenon. This is that people’s perception of risk depends 
substantially on their world view, specifically on whether their outlook is 
hierarchical (as opposed to egalitarian) and/or individualist (as opposed 
to communitarian).73 We may envision this as a grid:74  
 
Under this “world view” theory, it is not surprising that “those with 
a[n] . . . individualistic orientation[, who] expect individuals to ‘fend for 
70 Id. at 44, xxxiv; Melissa L. Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: 
The ‘White Male’ Effect, 2 HEALTHY RISK & SOC’Y 159, 163-64 (2000).  
71 Finucane et al., supra note 70.  
72 Id.; see also Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: 
Explaining the White Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 465, 480-83 (2007). Many researchers have found that different levels of 
knowledge about a particular hazard do not account for gender differences in 
risk perception, although they have also discerned that in general women are 
more comfortable than men in expressing anxiety about particular risks. Jan L. 
Hitchcock, Gender Differences in Risk Perception: Broadening the Contexts, 12 
RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV’T 179, 182, 188, 201-02 (2001).  
73 Kahan et al., supra note 72, at 483 (reviewing the literature); see also 
Finucane et al., supra note 70, at 160-61, 170.  
74 Kahan et al., supra note 72, at 468. 
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themselves and therefore tend to be competitive,’” are more likely to 
“dismiss claims of environmental risk as specious, in line with their 
commitment to the autonomy of markets and other private orderings.”75 
Similarly, those holding a hierarchical world view are less likely to 
perceive risk, because “assertions of environmental catastrophe” carry an 
implicit threat to the “competence of social and governmental elites.”76 
In each case, individuals’ race and gender intersect with their distinctive 
worldviews “as a defensive response to a form of cultural identity 
threat,” leading them to be more or less sensitive to potential risk in 
order to minimize that threat.77 Thus, those with a communitarian 
outlook “assume that individuals will ‘interact frequently . . . in a wide 
range of activities’ in which they must ‘depend on one another,’ a 
condition that promotes values of solidarity.”78 Communitarians are 
much more likely than individualists to be aware of, and concerned 
about, environmental and technological risks.79 In their view, reducing 
these risks is justified because a failure to do so will “produce social 
inequality and legitimize unconstrained self-interest.”80 Similarly, those 
with more “egalitarian” attitudes—that is, people who reject 
predetermined roles based on status categories like gender, age, and 
family connections—are also more likely to perceive technological 
activities to be risky.81  
Overall, multiple studies have found that the white male subjects 
who judged environmental and technological risks to be the lowest 
shared important demographic and world view characteristics. They 
were better educated, made more money, were politically conservative, 
and trusted experts, institutions, and authority. Perhaps as a result, they 
were disinclined to give average citizens the power to decide how risk 
should be managed.82  
Many studies have replicated these findings,83 which have important 
implications for understanding the social and psychological construction 
of risk. Several authors suggest that the reason for the strong and 
persistent connection between world view and attitude toward risk is that 
75 Id. at 468-69 (discussing grid).  
76 Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining 
the White Male Effect in Risk Perception 5 (Yale Faculty Scholarship Series, 
Paper 101, 2007), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/ 
101.  
77 Kahan et al., supra note 72, at 467. 
78 Id. at 469 (ellipses in original). 
79 Id. at 469, 480. 
80 Id. at 469. 
81 Id.  
82 SLOVIC, supra note 62, at xxxiv; Finucane et al., supra note 70, at 160-61. 
83 Kahan et al., supra note 72, at 465-66 (citing studies). 
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people’s world views are threatened by the adoption of different attitudes 
toward risk.84 For example, a male with a hierarchical world view is 
likely to believe that men, rather than women, should be in positions of 
public authority and that women should remain within the private, 
domestic sphere.85 For such a man, recognition of significant 
environmental risks would challenge “the prerogatives and competence 
of social and governmental elites,” threatening the man’s identity as a 
member of a privileged group.86 One can compare this man with a 
hypothetical woman whose worldview is both hierarchical and 
communitarian. She is most likely to believe abortion is risky to women, 
because abortion poses a threat to the ideal of motherhood as a woman’s 
most virtuous role.87 The persistence of these cognitive biases—the fact 
that individuals shape their assessment of information in a way that 
reinforces the existing beliefs of the group to which they belong88—
helps explain not only the continued ferocity of America’s culture wars 
over the last four decades, but also the difficulties scientists and other 
experts face in convincing people to consider new information as a 
means of changing their attitudes about particular risks.89  
People also tend to view a risk as more or less serious depending on 
whether they have experienced it personally or have heard about it from 
84 Id. at 480-83; SLOVIC, supra note 62, at xxxiv; Finucane et al., supra note 70, 
at 160-61. 
85 Kahan, supra note 72, at 474.  
86 Id. Similarly, a person with an individualistic (as opposed to communitarian) 
worldview would tend to have pro-market attitudes, and might feel his identity 
threatened were he to acknowledge that commercial activities were potentially 
risky. 
87 Kahan et al., supra note 76, at 12, 17-18, 30. 
88 Id. at 6, 9. 
89 Id. at 35-36. Other psychological factors also play an important role in 
shaping individuals’ risk assessments. For example, risks which are assumed 
voluntarily are perceived as less dangerous than those which are imposed on 
one as a result of law, obligation, or coercion. On the other hand, a more neutral 
reason for experiencing a lack of control over the risk may make it more 
acceptable, such as when a risk is seen as the only possible alternative, or when 
it is encountered at work rather than in a person’s private life. Risks that are 
presented as “known” invoke less dread than those that are indeterminate. 
Similarly, risks whose consequences will be apparent immediately appear less 
dangerous than those whose consequences will materialize in the future. R.E. 
Spier, Perception of Risk of Vaccine Adverse Effects: A Historical Perspective, 
20 VACCINE S78, S78 (2002); see also Noel T. Brewer et al., Meta-Analysis of 
the Relationship Between Risk Perception and Health Behavior: The Example of 
Vaccination, 26 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 136, 137 (2007) (noting that “risk” itself is 
an ambiguous term, which can be broken down into constituent elements of 
perceived likelihood of harm, perceived susceptibility to that harm, and 
perceived severity if that harm materializes). 
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the media. This is often called “the availability heuristic.”90 A simple 
story of a terrible event can be much more powerful than a detailed and 
well-documented statistical analysis of risk, even if (or perhaps precisely 
because) the simple story lacks nuance and specificity.91 In practice, 
many people are more concerned about newly discovered risks (such as 
lead in toys) than long-standing risks that have faded into the 
background (such as lead poisoning from old paint, or injuries from 
common household appliances).92 Research has also shown that people 
often pay more attention to risks that are highlighted by the media even 
if they are less likely to occur.93  
B. RISK COMMUNICATION 
The same psychological factors and socio-cultural preferences that 
shape risk perception also influence the ways that we talk about risk, 
particularly the discussions that take place among experts, policymakers, 
and the public. Here, the availability heuristic, coupled with the average 
person’s desire for straightforward explanations of complicated 
phenomena, makes it easy for the public to be persuaded by simple, 
though incomplete, narratives about risk. It is difficult to compete with a 
well-told and compelling anecdote, even though a more nuanced risk 
assessment is more accurate.  
For example, a study of attitudes toward mandatory HPV 
vaccination of girls showed that people’s attitudes about the desirability 
of mandating vaccination were heavily skewed by the apparent identity 
of the expert who offered an opinion about vaccination. As explained by 
Dan Kahan, the researchers “constructed arguments for and against 
mandatory vaccination and matched them with fictional male experts, 
whose appearance . . . and publication titles [presented] . . . distinct 
cultural perspectives.” When the putative anti-vaccine expert fit a 
hierarchical and individualistic profile, people who “shared those values 
and who were . . . predisposed to see the vaccine as risky became even 
more intensely opposed to it.” Similarly, when the putative expert 
appeared to hold communitarian and egalitarian values and supported the 
vaccine, those who also had communitarian and egalitarian world views 
90 Thomas B. Newman, The Power of Stories over Statistics, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 
1424, 1426 (2003).  
91 See id. at 1426-27. 
92 See, e.g., Abigail Goldman, Lead-Paint Toys Aren’t the Biggest Risk, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/23/business/fi-
kidrisk23. 
93 As described by Cass Sunstein, “[w]hen people lack statistical knowledge, 
they consider risks to be significant if they can easily think of instances in 
which those risks came to fruition.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 5 (2005); 
see also Peggy Ornstein, The Toxic Paradox, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at 
MM17.  
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became even more vociferous in their support for vaccination. However, 
when researchers switched the expert personas so that the hierarchical 
expert supported mandatory vaccination and the egalitarian expert 
opposed it, the experimental subjects responded in the opposite manner, 
making their polarized views disappear.94 This study provides an 
important lesson about risk communication. In order for people to be 
open to a new understanding of risk, “information must be transmitted in 
a form that makes individuals’ acceptance of it compatible with their 
core cultural commitments. It is not enough that the information be true; 
it must be framed in a manner that bears an acceptable social 
meaning.”95 In short, one cannot persuade a skeptical public simply by 
presenting more facts.96  
This experiment also illustrates the importance of trust in 
understanding and talking about risk. If the listener does not trust the 
person who is assessing, evaluating, or managing risk, then the speaker 
faces an uphill battle of persuasion, and the listener’s skepticism will be 
hard to overcome. Risk and trust are thus highly interactive. When 
government agencies charged with assessing and managing risk offer 
“highly confident statements about [a] . . . problem[,] they can build 
public confidence [in the agency’s competency but at the same time] 
lead citizens to question their honesty. [Conversely, f]ull and open 
expressions of uncertainty can make the agent appear more honest, but 
(alas) less competent.”97 Further, both “media and special interest groups 
. . . [are] quite skilled in bringing trust-destroying news to public 
attention.”  
An important example appears in current controversies over 
childhood vaccination. In an era in which few parents have seen 
firsthand the deadly consequences of a disease that could have been 
prevented by vaccination,98 it is easy for parents to focus on 
vaccination’s potential risks, even if they are mild. Between 2000 and 
2004, the national Institute of Medicine (the IOM) convened eight 
separate task forces to evaluate the scientific evidence of an asserted 
causal connection between vaccination and the development of autism.99 
The IOM found no causal relationship between the measles, mumps and 
94 Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296 (2010).  
95 Kahan et al., supra note 72, at 497 (emphasis added). 
96 See, e.g., Hitchcock, supra note 72; see also ASS’N OF STATE AND 
TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY ABOUT 
VACCINES: NEW COMMUNICATION RESOURCES FOR HEALTH OFFICIALS (2010), 
available at http://www.astho.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=5464. 
97 Cullen & Small, supra note 63, at 168. 
98 Kathryn M. Edwards, State Mandates and Childhood Immunization, 284 
JAMA 3171, 3171 (2000).  
99 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMMUNIZATION SAFETY REVIEW: VACCINES AND 
AUTISM 2 (2004). 
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rubella vaccination and the development of autism; similarly it found no 
causal relationship between administration of vaccines containing 
thimerosal and the development of autism.100 However, out of an 
abundance of caution, the IOM recommended removing the preservative 
thimerosal from childhood vaccines, which ironically served to fuel 
skeptics’ concerns that thimerosal was harmful.101 Vaccination 
opponents have even twisted the fact that over the last several decades 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) have worked to develop an elaborate 
vaccine safety system, alleging that this is itself evidence of a significant 
risk of harm from vaccination.102  
Paul Slovic asserts that the American democratic system exacerbates 
inherent difficulties in risk communication. He argues that “in the US, 
risk-management tends to rely heavily upon an adversarial legal system 
that pits expert against expert, contradicting each other’s risk 
assessments and further destroying the public trust.”103American 
administrative law depends on the input of competing scientific and 
economic experts and requires a good deal of procedural due process as 
100 Id. at 16, 151-52. 
101 Thimerosal was added as a vaccine preservative to guard against 
contamination of vaccine. In the U.S. such preservatives are no longer necessary 
because no vaccine is presently administered from multiple dose vials any 
longer; however, in much of the developing world that is the only affordable 
way to provide vaccination. A 2010 study examining maternal and infant 
exposure to thimerosal found no evidence of a casual relationship between 
prenatal and infant thimerosal exposure and the development of an autism 
spectrum disorder. Cristofer S. Price et al., Prenatal and Infant Exposure to 
Thimerosal from Vaccines and Immunoglobulins and Risk of Autism, 126 
PEDIATRICS 656, 656 (2010). This study confirms a number of earlier studies. 
102 This system, known as VAERS (the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting 
System), permits doctors and parents to report suspected adverse vaccination 
events and provides epidemiologists with the ability to scrutinize data for 
potential patterns of injury. The existence of VAERS could well be seen as 
evidence that the government is on top of the vaccine safety issue. However, 
critics of vaccination assert that the adverse effects which are reported are only 
the tip of the iceberg, and that in fact vaccines are very dangerous. See, e.g., 
Barbara Loe Fisher, In the Wake of Vaccines, MOTHERING, Sept./Oct. 2004, at 
38, 42. Fisher’s faulty logic begins with the assertion that “each year about 
12,000 reports are made to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System; 
parents as well as doctors can make those reports.” See id. She continues, 
“However, if that number represents only 10 percent of what is actually 
occurring, then the actual number may be 120,000 vaccine-adverse events. If 
doctors report vaccine reactions as infrequently as [former FDA Commissioner] 
Dr. [David] Kessler said they report prescription-drug reactions, and the number 
12,000 is only 1 percent of the actual total, then the real number may be 1.2 
million vaccine-adverse events annually.” Id. 
103 SLOVIC, supra note 62, at xxxv. 
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well as open deliberations about risk assessment and risk management. 
Yet this emphasis on transparency and full airing of scientific and 
economic disagreements may actually make risk communication both 
more difficult and less compelling. The processes by which 
administrative agencies discuss and manage risk bears a marked 
similarity to highly contested insanity defense cases, in which dueling 
psychiatrists tend to present starkly different visions of the defendant’s 
criminal responsibility. Critics describe these forensic differences as a 
“battle of the experts” or “flipping coins in the courtroom.”104 In many 
notable instances, when agency decisions are challenged in the federal 
courts, the struggle of judges grappling with risk is both public and 
painful.105 
III. HOW THE LAW REFLECTS AND SUPPORTS THE SOCIAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 
We thus come to the important question: “So what?” Why does it 
matter that the way people perceive and talk about risk depends in 
important and unexpected ways on their race, gender, social status, and 
personal world view? It matters, of course, because the law is also 
socially constructed. Law is not merely a set of positive commandments 
and prohibitions—the criminal code and regulatory requirements—or a 
set of blackletter rules derived from case precedents. Rather, the law also 
embodies a world view, built on underlying assumptions and norms with 
the avowed goal of shaping human behavior. For example, both criminal 
law and tort law have deterrence as a major goal, as well as the 
compensation of injured victims and the actual and symbolic imposition 
of punishment and blame.106  
Three important aspects of American law both permit and reinforce 
the emphasis on mothers as the primary source of harm to their children. 
The first is the essential role that the “reasonable person” plays in 
imposing liability in tort and in criminal law. The second is the elastic set 
of rules that govern the law of causation and the historical tendency of 
the law to prefer an individually-based, rather than a multi-factorial, 
model of causation.107 The third is the American legal system’s emphasis 
104 Bruce Ennis & Thomas Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of 
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974). 
105 See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 
(1980); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). See infra 
Part III.C. for a discussion of both cases.  
106 Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement 
in Mass Product Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 882-88 (2005); Michael L. 
Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 443, 525-27 (2011).  
107 Ironically, this may be changing in light of the decision in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), in which the Supreme 
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on realized, rather than threatened, harm, evidenced currently by 
profound skepticism about precautionary regulation.108 Each of these 
three features of American law is significant in its own right, yet it is 
also important to note that they are linked by the common construct of 
foreseeability. Taken individually and together, these three core legal 
phenomena have profound implications for how the American legal 
system responds to complex situations of risk creation and multiple 
causal forces in general. More specifically, these three legal phenomena 
also have important impacts on how American law views the actions—or 
inactions—of mothers vis-à-vis their children.  
A. THE REASONABLE PERSON  
 As all first year law students know, the “reasonable person” is a 
central concept in the law. An individual who falls below the standard of 
behavior expected of the reasonably prudent person—because she or he 
is too careless, too clumsy, or too clueless—is liable in tort for 
negligence109 and, in certain cases, may even be criminally 
responsible.110 However, the construction of the “reasonable person” is 
neither neutral nor abstract. Writing as a twenty-first century legal 
realist, Professor Steven Hetcher asserts that mainstream tort scholars111 
Court granted corporations and other fictional persons the full First Amendment 
rights previously accorded only to human individuals.  
108 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 
23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 22 (2006). 
109 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3, 
Negligence, cmt. a. Implicit in the finding that a defendant is negligent is that 
s/he had a duty to act in a reasonable manner which was breached by the 
defendant’s actions or failure to act. The reasonableness of a defendant’s actions 
is measured in part by foreseeability: “In order to determine whether appropriate 
care was exercised, the factfinder must assess the foreseeable risk at the time of 
the defendant’s alleged negligence.” Id. § 7, Duty, cmt. j.  
110 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL Code §§ 2.02(2)(d), 210.4 (2012) (defining 
negligently and negligent homicide, respectively); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 
192(b) (defining involuntary manslaughter, inter alia, as a killing that occurs 
“without due caution and circumspection”); State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (holding Native American parents liable for 
manslaughter because they did not “understand the significance or seriousness 
of the baby’s symptoms” [gangrene due to an abscessed tooth] when reasonable 
parents would have). At the time Williams was decided, the Washington 
manslaughter law embodied the civil law standard of simple negligence but this 
was subsequently changed to gross (criminal) negligence. State v. Norman, 808 
P.2d 1159, 1164 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 
111 Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in 
Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633 (2003). These scholars are the architects of 
the Restatement of Torts and the people who fill the law journals with 
theoretical ruminations. Hetcher refers to them as “legal centralis[ts],” a term he 
borrows from Robert Ellickson. Ellickson describes “legal centralism” as “the 
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have missed the boat when they announce substantive tort law principles 
without considering the crucial role of the jury in articulating that law. 
Hetcher observes that when juries decide cases, they bring their own 
moral intuitions and preconceived notions of appropriate behavior to the 
deliberative process. When jurors are told to decide the issue of 
negligence using the “reasonable person” standard, their own morally 
and culturally constructed sense of how a reasonable person would act 
has a major impact on the outcome of the case.112 In Hetcher’s words,  
[T]here is a de facto standard that results from the jury’s 
application of the formal standard through the lens of its 
normative vision. The natural consequence of these de 
facto standards is that different jurors with different sets 
of norms can be expected to produce different outcomes 
. . . . A neutral, objective application of the standard to 
the facts simply does not exist.113  
In practice, then, juries deciding cases go far beyond objective “fact-
finding.” They actually make law, what Judge Learned Hand called 
“legislation in parvo,” or little laws.114 This jury-made law exists totally 
apart from what legal scholars traditionally consider to be law, such as 
case precedents, statutes embodying a particular rule, or the more gentle 
“persuasive authority” of sources like the Restatement.115 Further, the 
principles that guide the jury are often quite distinct from the rules of 
law which law students learn and judicial opinions announce.116 For 
tendency to believe that ‘the state functions as the sole creator of operative rules 
of entitlement among individuals.’” Id. at 634.  
112 Hetcher cites the “venerable” case of Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 
(C.P. 1837), to illustrate the importance of the jurors’ background norms in the 
deliberative process. These norms come into play whether or not attorneys for 
the respective parties have introduced evidence of custom to show the existence 
of a particular standard of care. Hetcher, supra note 111, at 640. Of course, in 
contrast to documents or testimony offered by a litigant to demonstrate the 
existence of an established custom, the application of jurors’ norms of 
appropriate behavior occurs without any judicial oversight. Compare this with 
jury’s consideration of facts known to one or more jurors, which is a ground for 
reversal of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701, 
706 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that when jurors who were nurses shared their 
professional knowledge with the rest of the jury, the fact-finding process was 
impaired). 
113 Hetcher, supra note 111, at 640 (emphasis added). 
114 Id. at 641. 
115 See, e.g., Michael D. Green & Larry S. Stewart, The New Restatement’s Top 
Ten Tort Tools, 46 APR TRIAL 44, 48 (2010).  
116 Hetcher thinks this is a good thing. “From the perspective of democratic 
theory, the jury norm effect’s impact on formal legal outcomes is an anti-elitist . 
. . feature of American tort law . . . . Jury practices arguably embody important 
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example, when jurors endeavor to apply the “reasonable person” test,117 
they are much more likely to rely on their intuitive sense of 
reasonableness118 than on either the utilitarian cost-benefit rule 
formulated by Judge Learned Hand as the test for negligence119 now 
embodied in the Restatement,120 or on a “corrective justice” model, as 
articulated by Julius Coleman, among others.121  
This conclusion—that the law is literally socially constructed—
makes sense in light of what we know about the complex nature of risk 
perception, risk assessment, and risk management. As discussed 
previously, whether or not a particular action or failure to act is “risky” 
lies in the eye of the beholder. In deciding that a defendant was 
negligent, a jury is implicitly finding that a risk existed, that the 
defendant had a duty to protect against it,122 failed to do so, and caused 
harm.123 Making this type of risk determination depends both on the 
context in which a potential harm arises, about which jurors may hold 
preconceived notions of appropriate behavior, and on jurors’ world views 
and other cognitive biases.  
1. The Reasonable Pregnant Woman: A Tort Story 
norms of political participation, value pluralism, and separation of powers.” 
Hetcher, supra note 111, at 636.  
117 Id. at 639-40 (asserting that jurors are not usually given any detailed 
instructions on the reasonable person, or a definition of this hypothetical 
individual (citing Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand 
Formula Balancing, The Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. 
L. REV. 813, 815 (2001))).  
118 See generally Hetcher, supra note 111, at 641-42; CAROL B. ANDERSON, 
INSIDE JURORS’ MINDS: THE HIERARCHY OF JUROR DECISION-MAKING, A 
PRIMER ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION: THE TRIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO 
UNDERSTANDING HOW JURORS THINK 9-25, 47-49, 63-68 (National Institute for 
Trial Advocacy 2012). Indeed, jurors tend to evaluate the reasonableness of 
another’s behavior according to the heightened standard of their idealized rather 
than actual selves.  
119 See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947).  
120 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3. See especially id. cmt. e. 
121 Hetcher, supra note 111, at 649-57.  
122 As noted previously, negligence law generally presumes that all actors have a 
duty to avoid physical harm when their conduct creates a risk of harm to others, 
unless they fall into a category in which policy considerations militate against 
imposing a duty as a matter of law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL 
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7, Duty, cmt. a.  
123 But cf. Michael D. Green, Symposium, Flying Trampolines and Falling 
Bookcases: Understanding the Third Restatement of Torts, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1011, 1015 (2010).  
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Let us examine briefly one area in which jurors’ normative beliefs 
could significantly affect their determination of negligence—the 
question of whether pregnant women should be held liable for creating a 
risk of harm to their fetuses, either in tort or criminal law. Six reported 
cases have addressed the question of whether children can seek tort 
damages from their mothers based on the mothers’ actions while 
pregnant; the decisions are evenly split.124 Although the “back stories” 
of these cases are not clear, the lawsuits’ apparent goal was to provide 
economic compensation to injured children, since in each case the 
mother was sued by the child’s father or guardian. The cases focused on 
two separate legal questions: first, did the pregnant woman have a legal 
duty to her fetus to protect it against potential harm, and second, if she 
did, did she behave unreasonably, i.e., negligently, in not taking 
sufficient precautions to avoid that harm? Four cases involved motor 
vehicle accidents in which the pregnant women either drove or crossed 
the street negligently.125 Two cases focused on the mothers’ use of drugs 
while pregnant. One of these cases involved a legal drug, Tetracycline, 
which apparently resulted in the child having discolored teeth.126 The 
other involved the pregnant woman’s use of alcohol and cocaine, 
allegedly causing cognitive and physical harm to her child.127  
124 In chronological order, the cases are Grodin v. Grodin, 310 N.W.2d 869 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981), Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988), 
Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992), Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 
(Tex. App. 1999), Nat’l Cas. Co. v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 807 So. 2d 86 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), and Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 
2004). In addition, a recent Wisconsin decision, Tesar v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 
351 (Wis. App. 2010), rev. denied, 797 N.W.2d 523 (2011), addressed the 
closely related circumstances of a child who was delivered stillborn after his 
pregnant mother was involved in a car accident in which she and the driver of 
another car were both alleged to have driven negligently. In this case, which was 
decided on appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants, the father of an “unborn child” was permitted to bring a cause of 
action for wrongful death. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin declined to draw 
a distinction in the wrongful death context between a fetus and a living child. 
Tesar, 789 N.W.2d at 361-64. The court also relied heavily on Wisconsin’s 
unusually broad concept of duty, based on the dissenting opinion in Palsgraf v. 
Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 340 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) which 
has been accepted only in Wisconsin and one other jurisdiction. Palsgraf, 162 
N.E. at 355-56. 
125 Stallman, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988), National Casualty, 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001), and Remy, 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004), are the cases in 
which the pregnant woman’s driving was alleged to be negligent; in Bonte, 616 
A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992), the pregnant woman was an allegedly negligent 
pedestrian.  
126 Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869. 
127 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 475. 
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Out of the six cases, three courts permitted the child to sue the 
mother, leaving it up to the jury whether the mother acted reasonably in 
driving her car, crossing the street, or taking Tetracycline while she was 
pregnant.128 Two of the courts explicitly cited the goal of providing 
compensation to an injured child, while in the third case this reasoning 
was implicit.129  
In the three cases that reached the opposite conclusion, courts 
recognized the practical and policy problems that would flow from the 
imposition of a duty in tort on pregnant women. These include not only 
the difficulty of articulating a clear and objective standard for juries to 
follow, but also the risk of interfering with women’s right to privacy and 
autonomy and the potential for adverse and unintended outcomes for 
children’s health.130 In Stallman v. Youngquist,131 the Illinois Supreme 
Court refused to allow a child injured in a car accident in which her 
pregnant mother was driving to sue her mother for negligence.132 The 
court began by considering the “fact of life” that a pregnant woman’s 
“every waking and sleeping moment . . . shapes the prenatal environment 
which forms the world for the developing fetus.”133 The court 
characterized the relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus 
as “unlike the relationship between any other plaintiff and defendant.”134 
The Stallman court ruled that it was impermissible to impose a legal duty 
128 Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869-70 (framing the question as a simple factual 
question for the jury: did the woman’s Tetracycline use constitute a “reasonable 
exercise of parental discretion?”); see, e.g., Thelen v. Thelen, 174 Mich. App. 
380, 383 (1989) (stating that the appropriate question to be addressed in a 
child’s lawsuit against a parent is not whether the parent’s behavior was 
reasonable but whether the parent’s action could be seen as reasonably within 
the scope of protected parental authority or discretion); Mayberry v. Pryor, 134 
Mich. App. 826, 832-33 (1984) (criticizing the reasoning in Grodin and stating 
that the appropriate question to be addressed in a child’s lawsuit against a parent 
is not whether the parent’s behavior was reasonable but whether the parent’s 
action could be seen as reasonably within the scope of protected parental 
authority or discretion).  
129 Nat’l Cas. Co., 807 So. 2d at 87; Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869; Bonte, 616 
A.2d at 465-66 (stating, in recognizing a duty of care for pregnant women, that 
it should be measured by the same standard of care applicable to mothers of 
born children). 
130 Stallman, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988); Remy, 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004); 
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999). 
131 Stallman, 531 N.E.2d 355. 
132 Id. at 355-56, 358, 361 (criticizing the Grodin decision, suggesting that the 
Michigan court had confused the question of whether parental tort immunity 
should be abrogated with the different issue of whether a pregnant woman owed 
a tort duty to her fetus). 
133 Id. at 360. 
134 Id. 
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of care on a pregnant woman, articulating four reasons for its holding,135 
each of which recognizes the social and psychological construction of 
the “reasonably prudent person.” First, it would be impossible either to 
limit or define a pregnant woman’s duty to her fetus, since so many 
actions taken in a woman’s life, even prior to conception, could affect a 
fetus.136 Second, it would be impossible to develop an objective standard 
applicable to women from diverse socio-economic backgrounds with 
different access to healthcare, who might or might not know whether 
they were pregnant.137 Third, the court declared that judicial recognition 
of a common law cause of action constituted an “unprecedented 
intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of the [female] citizens of this 
State,”138 which, under separation of powers doctrine, should only be 
accomplished by the legislature, and even then, “only after thorough 
investigation, study, and debate.”139 Finally, the court acknowledged the 
limits of tort liability in shaping human behavior. It declared that “[t]he 
way to effectuate the birth of healthy babies is not . . . through after-the-
fact civil liability in tort for individual mothers, but rather through 
before-the-fact education of all women and families about prenatal 
development.”140 
In 2004, in Remy v. MacDonald,141the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court reached a similar result.142 The court recognized that there 
was substantial disagreement over whether pregnant women should be 
potentially liable for causing fetal harm. Noting the virtually unlimited 
range of circumstances in which a woman could be sued, the court found 
that there was no principled way to limit pregnant women’s liability for 
135 Id. at 359-60. 
136 Id. at 360. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 361. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. Reaching a similar result, the Supreme Court of Canada decided Dobson 
v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 (Can.). The court relied explicitly on the 
Stallman court’s reasoning, emphasizing the unique relationship between the 
pregnant woman and the fetus, the pregnant woman’s independent privacy and 
autonomy rights, the impossibility of devising an objective standard of pre-
maternal conduct, and the inevitable slippery slope upon which courts, litigants, 
and juries would be launched in trying to determine the contours of appropriate 
behavior while pregnant.  
141 Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004). 
142 The court declined to permit a child to sue its mother for prenatal harm—
premature birth and related injuries—caused by her alleged negligent driving. 
Id. at 262, 266-67. 
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causing fetal harm to the motor vehicle context in which insurance was 
frequently available to fund compensatory damages.143  
The third case, Chenault v. Huie,144 addressed more difficult factual 
circumstances, in which a woman who used both legal and illegal drugs 
while pregnant gave birth to a child with developmental problems and 
cerebral palsy. Her sister, the child’s guardian, sued, seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages for the mother’s alleged 
negligence.145 Largely tracking the reasoning of Stallman, the Texas 
Court of Appeals declined to recognize a common law cause of action by 
a child against its mother for prenatal harm.146 In addition, the court 
noted the potential adverse impact of imposing civil liability on pregnant 
women, explaining that women who feared liability might not be candid 
with their physicians and thus receive less than adequate prenatal 
care.147  
2. The Reasonable Parent in Criminal Law 
The criminal law also relies on the concept of the “reasonable 
person,” including the sub-categories of the “reasonable parent” and the 
“reasonable mother.” There is an ongoing debate in the criminal law 
about how much to “subjectivize” the “reasonable person.” Is she or he 
the reasonable person of the same age, gender, race, temperament, and 
other characteristics of the defendant, or only a more abstract and reified 
construction?148 Most law students will recall the case of People v. 
143 The court explicitly rejected the reasoning of Grodin, Bonte, and National 
Casualty, and found that courts should recognize the “inherent and important 
differences between a fetus, in utero, and a child already born, that permits [sic] 
a bright line to be drawn around the zone of potential tort liability of one who is 
still biologically joined to an injured plaintiff.” Id. at 263-67. 
144 Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999). 
145 Id. at 475-76. 
146 The Texas court declared that, while “the law wisely no longer treats a fetus 
as only a part of the mother, the law would ignore the equally important 
physical realities of pregnancy if it treated the fetus as an individual entirely 
separate from his mother.” The court pointed to the difficulty of establishing an 
objective, uniform standard of care for pregnant and potentially pregnant 
women, noting the unavoidable subjectivity of jurors, which would lead 
inevitably to inconsistent and unpredictable jury verdicts. In addition the court 
found that to recognize a cause of action here would invade women’s autonomy 
and interfere with women’s rights to control their daily lives. The court also held 
that decisions about fetal protection were best left to the legislature. Id. at 475-
78. 
147 Id. at 478. 
148 See, e.g., Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, [1978] Eng. Rep. 168 (H.L.); 
rev’d, Regina v. Smith (Morgan), [2001] 1 A.C. 146. For a summary of the 
evolution of this doctrine in the United Kingdom, see SANFORD H. KADISH ET 
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Williams,149 in which poorly educated Native American parents were 
prosecuted for manslaughter after their infant son died from gangrene 
and pneumonia resulting from the lack of treatment for an abscessed 
tooth. The evidence at trial showed that the parents failed to act because 
they believed both that the child’s situation was not dangerous and that if 
they had brought him to medical authorities, they might have been 
accused of child neglect and would have lost custody of the child—
something that had happened to relatives.150 In class discussion, most 
students recognize that their application of the negligence standard 
inevitably involves a normative evaluation of the parents’ conduct. 
However, the class is often divided over whether the choice of a 
particular “reasonable person” standard should favor retributive or 
deterrent goals. In practice, the question becomes whether imposing 
liability will unfairly stigmatize Native Americans—and punish these 
particular parents too severely—or be more likely to ensure that in the 
future, parents of all social and educational strata will seek medical 
attention for children who might be at risk of harm. 
In a different criminal context, the question of when and whether a 
reasonable person has a duty to prevent injuries caused by the actions of 
another has important ramifications for mothers. In general, Anglo-
American criminal law imposes no duty to rescue.151 A failure to act 
becomes the legal equivalent of the actus reus required by the criminal 
law only when the defendant has a duty to act. Such a duty may be 
derived from a statute, contract, status (such as being a parent), or it may 
be imposed where “one has voluntarily assumed the duty of care of 
another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from 
AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 408-10 (8th ed. 
2007).  
149 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
150 Id. at 1173-74.  
151 John Kleinig, Good Samaritanism, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 382 (1976), cited in 
KADISH ET AL., supra note 148, at 198. Only six states impose any duty to act, 
and then only in various narrowly delineated circumstances (e.g., the person in 
peril is “exposed to grave physical harm” (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 
2012)), or is at the scene of an emergency (R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-56-1 (West 
2012) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.662 (West Supp. 2000)), or the victim of a 
sexual crime (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West 2000) and R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-
37-3.3 (West 1994 reenactment)) or violent crime (WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§940.34(2)(a) (West 1997) and HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (LexisNexis 
1995))).  
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rendering aid.”152 This staunchly libertarian no-duty rule resonates with 
America’s preference for autonomy and individual rights.153  
A marked exception to the “no duty” rule appears in the case of 
parents, especially mothers. Every year, American women are prosecuted 
for homicide and other crimes when their children are killed by the 
woman’s male partner, either a husband or boyfriend.154 The converse is 
much less likely to be true.155 This reflects a variety of factors, including 
the socially and legally constructed nature of the “reasonable person,” 
especially the “reasonable mother,” the elastic conception of parental 
duty,156 and the principles of causation, which I will explore in more 
detail shortly. Here, the role of foreseeability in defining legal 
obligations is significant. At the heart of negligence law is the principle 
that a person has no duty to prevent harm unless that harm is 
foreseeable.157 It is easy to say that for a mother, harm to her children is 
always foreseeable if her partner has any history of violent, dangerous, 
or simply uncaring behavior, thus creating a duty to act to prevent that 
harm. In practice, fathers are much less likely to be prosecuted or to 
suffer civil consequences for their failure to protect their children from 
harm actively committed by their wives or girlfriends.158 I will now turn 
152 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962); see also 
MODEL PENAL CODE §2.01(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining the 
circumstances under which an omission constitutes an act). 
153 Kleinig, supra note 151. 
154 Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using Our 
Knowledge of Battered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to 
Act, in 1A CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
ISSUES 197, 198 (Sandra Anderson-Garcia & Robert Batey eds.,1991). 
155 Saundra Chung, Mama Mia! How Gender Stereotyping May Play a Role in 
the Prosecution of Child Fatality Cases, 9 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 
205, 205-10 (2009); Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing to Protect Whom? A 
Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 273-74 (2001).  
156 In cases in which women are prosecuted based on their asserted failure to act 
when they had a duty to act, this duty may be found in a specific statute or 
derived from the common law. See, e.g., Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 
874 (Ky. 1997) (with majority and concurring judges relying on statutory and 
common law sources, respectively), discussed in Lissa Griffin, “Which One of 
You Did It?” Criminal Liability for “Causing or Allowing” the Death of A 
Child, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 89 (2004); see also Erickson, supra note 
154, at 198-203. 
157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3, 
Negligence. Even then, foreseeability will not always be enough to impose 
liability, because of other policy considerations. See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, 
Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in the 
Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 762-67 (2005) 
(discussing the development of rules on social host liability).  
158 See Chung, supra note 155, at 205-10; Fugate, supra note 155, at 273-74. 
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to the implications of finding such a duty as we discuss American law’s 
approach to causation.  
B. CAUSATION AND ITS FOCUS ON A UNITARY SOURCE OF HARM  
In the same way that an elastic conception of the reasonable mother 
makes it easy for a jury to find that a specific mother breached her duty 
to her child, the historical bias of American law in favor of a unitary, 
rather than multi-factorial, model of causation makes it easy for 
American tort lawyers, prosecutors, and juries to focus on mothers as the 
cause of harm to their children. This emphasis on finding a single source 
of harm is, in part, a carryover from the pre-industrial Anglo-American 
legal system, which reflected moral and religious notions of personal 
responsibility and largely ignored the possibility of multiple 
causation.159 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
American legal theorists postulated that law was a science,160 with 
“correct legal principles . . . [, including the method for determining the 
proximate cause, being deducible] through logical and objective 
inquiry.”161 This emphasis on individual actions and actors is 
particularly apparent in tort law and its dual requirements of actual cause 
(usually stated using the “but-for” test) and proximate cause (referred to 
in the Third Restatement as “scope of liability”).162 Proximate cause is 
predicated on foreseeability:163 only if the defendant could or should 
159 Cf. Jo Goodie, Toxic Tort and the Articulation of Environmental Risk, 12 
LAW TEXT CULTURE 69, 73, 78 (2008). This emphasis on the individual is also a 
central theme of American culture, and its theme of rugged individualism and 
personal responsibility. See also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, 
Lost in Translation: The Economic Analysis of Law in the United States and 
Europe, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 602, 605 (2006) (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE 
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT) AND A LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION 64 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 
1966) (1690)); William P. Marshall, National Healthcare and the American 
Constitutional Culture, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 139-44 (2012). 
160 This was the basic premise of Christopher Columbus Langdell, the originator 
of the case method of legal analysis and the founder of “modern” legal 
education. See Laura I. Appleman, The Rise of the Modern American Law 
School: How Professionalization, German Scholarship, and Legal Reform 
Shaped Our System of Legal Education, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 251, 252 (2005). 
161 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM §34 cmt. a (2010) (emphasis in original). 
162 See, e.g., June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1239-44 (10th Cir. 
2009); Green & Stewart, supra note 115, at 46; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 28-29 (2010).  
163 The authors of the Third Restatement acknowledge both that the role of 
proximate cause in setting limits on liability has evolved since the advent of 
comparative negligence and other doctrines for apportioning liability and that 
the concept of foreseeability is highly malleable. In some jurisdictions 
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have foreseen the potential harmful consequences of his or her actions 
can the defendant be found liable.164 Of course, since hindsight is 20-20, 
judges and juries are likely to find that the harm was foreseeable, and 
therefore it becomes relatively easy to establish proximate cause.165  
In contrast to writers in an earlier era, modern tort scholars recognize 
that the determination of both actual and proximate cause is inevitably 
value-laden, reflecting cultural attitudes about individual and corporate 
responsibility and implicating specific legal policy goals.166 Paralleling 
our earlier discussion of risk perception, social-psychological research 
shows that the way jurors and others draw “conclusions about cause and 
effect is not [a matter of science, that is,] . . . of passive discovery of 
objective fact.” Rather, determining causation is “an active process of 
foreseeability is the touchstone for a determination of proximate cause. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 34 cmts. a, c, & d (2010).  
164 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (1928), is the most famous 
American case making a policy-based argument for limiting liability to those 
harms which are reasonably foreseeable, requiring foreseeability both of the 
type of harm and the class of person as a prerequisite to a finding of proximate 
cause. As Judge Cardozo declared, “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines 
the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation.” Id. at 100. Proximate cause is 
referred to by current tort law scholars as “scope of liability.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
(2010). 
165 For an extreme example in a criminal case of a court stretching to find 
foreseeability, see KADISH ET AL., supra note 148, at 510-12 (citing People v. 
Acosta, F049145, 2006 WL 2831048, at *1-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2006)).  
166 In modern academic circles, there is a long-standing debate about whether 
causation is absolutely necessary as a predicate to liability. Corrective justice 
theorists, most notably Ernest Weinrib, insist that actual causation is necessary 
to preserve the moral, deontological basis for imposing liability in tort, while 
instrumentalist tort theorists, including Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, 
have asserted that proof of actual and specific causation is not necessary in view 
of tort law’s goals of preventing accidents, inducing behavioral change on the 
part of risk creators, and distributing losses on a widespread basis. Gifford, 
supra note 106, at 876-77, 881-87; see also Hetcher, supra note 111, at 647-58 
(discussing the dominant corrective justice and utilitarian (cost-benefit) 
approaches to tort law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 cmt. d (2010) (discussing the “rationales 
for imposing liability for negligent conduct”); MARTHA CHAMALLAS & 
JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT 
LAW 122-23 (2009) (suggesting that both jurors and framers of “the law” are 
unable to separate out “scientific” fact-finding from conscious and unconscious 
policy judgments); Hetcher, supra note 111, at 642-46 (discussing 
commentators’ recognition of jurors’ primitive strict liability intuitions as well 
as their tendency to act on the basis of comparative negligence, even when not 
instructed to do so). 
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social construction,” . . . varying according to people’s “time, place, 
culture and interest.”167  
The natural tendency of jurors, as well as legal scholars, to think of 
causation primarily in terms of individual actors—single causal agents—
plays out in the case of mothers and their children in two very interesting 
ways, each implicating different strands of causation doctrine. The first 
strand of doctrine involves both actual cause and proximate cause, but it 
assumes that at any given time there can be only one cause of harm. A 
second aspect of causation theory is illustrated in the tort landscape of 
childhood lead poisoning. Here landlords of apartments with peeling 
paint frequently defend against liability on the ground that the 
intellectual deficits of a lead-poisoned child plaintiff are not the result of 
lead ingestion but are instead due to the genetic or environmental 
influence of the child’s mother.168  
1. Mothers’ Liability for the Abusive Acts of Their Partners 
The legal principles of causation provide that, in some 
circumstances, the actions of one human being can “cut off” the causal 
chain of events initiated by another human being, creating a new “but 
for” cause of harm, which courts have denominated a “superseding” or 
“supervening” cause.169 When mothers are criminally prosecuted for 
failing to protect their children from harm from the mother’s boyfriend 
or husband, the concept of “superseding cause” permits a jury to focus 
on the construct of “the reasonable mother” to find, with the benefit of 
hindsight, that a mother who fails to act to prevent the foreseeable 
harmful actions of her husband or boyfriend is criminally responsible for 
that harm.170 Many jurors believe that a mother has an absolute duty to 
167 CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 166, at 124.  
168 See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
169 See, e.g., Goldring v. State, 654 A.2d 939 (Md. App. 1995) (discussing 
criminal foreseeability and intervening causation in the context of drag racing 
cases); see also State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1982); Jacobs v. 
State, 184 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Commonwealth v. Root, 170 
A.2d 310 (Pa. 1961). In the tort context see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. a (2010) (noting an 
evolution of tort law in this area from a pseudo-scientific and formalistic inquiry 
to the recognition “in the latter part of the 20th century that there are always 
multiple causes of an outcome”); see also Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause, Cause-
In-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 
968-69 (2001) (criticizing “the pseudo-scientific language of the ‘intervening’ 
factor breaking the ‘chain of causation’”).  
170 See cases discussed in Erickson, supra note 154, at 200-03; Griffin, supra 
note 156, at 95-98; Chung, supra note 155.  
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protect her child’s health.171 In cases in which the mother was present 
when the child was injured, it appears that nothing less than proof that 
the mother was beaten so severely that she could not intervene to protect 
her child will save the mother from prosecution or conviction.172 On the 
other hand, if the mother was not present when the child was injured, the 
prosecution is likely to argue that she should not have left the child in the 
man’s care, even if he was the child’s father, and even if she was 
working or otherwise acting to support her family.173 If there is any 
evidence that the mother was aware of the possibility that the man would 
harm the child, the prosecution will assert both that the mother had a 
duty to act and that her failure to act to intervene was the proximate 
cause of that harm, thus, justifying holding her criminally responsible.174 
Jurors, who will be instructed in general terms about a parent’s duty to 
protect a child from harm,175 are likely to be influenced by culturally 
constructed norms of what a “good mother” would do, as well as 
unconscious racial and class biases.176  
171 In the recent New York case of Nixzmary Brown, a seven year old girl was 
beaten to death by her stepfather. Both her mother and stepfather were charged 
with homicide; her mother was prosecuted on the basis of her alleged failure to 
act to prevent the killing. As one prospective juror explained, “‘[t]he biggest 
part of being a mother is protecting the child from the world.’” Chung, supra 
note 155, at 213-14. 
172 Erickson, supra note 154, at 197-98, 205 (discussing the prosecution’s 
decision to dismiss charges against Hedda Nussbaum, a severely battered 
woman, who was initially charged along with her husband in her daughter’s 
death, as well as the case of June Webb, who raised an unsuccessful defense of 
duress in United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
173 Alternatively, the prosecution may assert that the mother failed to meet her 
duty of providing medical care when she returned and found her child injured. 
Erickson, supra note 154, at 200-02 (citing People v. Atkins, 125 Cal. Rptr. 855 
(Cal. App. 1975) and State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986)). 
174 This evidence can support a finding that the mother was criminally culpable 
when she failed to act to remove the child from harm. See Commonwealth v 
Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (upholding mother’s conviction 
for child abuse for failing to successfully intervene to stop her daughter’s sexual 
abuse at the hands of her husband, despite substantial evidence of her husband’s 
violence and her efforts to move her daughter to a safe location); see also 
Michelle S. Jacobs, Criminal Law: Requiring Battered Women [to] Die: Murder 
Liability for Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 579, 585 (1998).  
175 See, for example, Cal. Jury Instr.-Crim. 1.40 (2009), which suffers from the 
same lack of definition as the “reasonable person” standard.  
176 Chung, supra note 155, at 213-14; Roberts, supra note 33, at 117. In 
addition, depending on the law of evidence in the particular state, it may be 
difficult for the mother to introduce evidence that she was also a victim of 
domestic violence or emotional coercion, which would be relevant to the issue 
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2. How Mothers Can Be Blamed To Avoid Liability for Toxic Torts 
Another surprising example of how mothers appear front and center 
in the discourse of risk arises in the context of lead poisoning. It is well 
known that exposure to lead is dangerous, even at low levels.177 It can 
cause neurological and cognitive impairments, behavioral problems, and 
even death.178 Today, most children poisoned by lead have ingested it in 
the form of lead paint flakes or inhaled it from lead dust.179 Both forms 
of lead are released into children’s homes when landlords fail to safely 
maintain paint surfaces.180 Tort litigation to compensate poisoned 
children has proceeded along two fronts: first, against the manufacturers 
of lead paints and pigments, and second, against landlords.181  
Despite lead’s conceded toxicity, it has been extremely difficult for 
children injured by exposure to lead dust and paint to successfully sue 
the manufacturers of lead paints and pigments due to the requirement of 
showing actual causation, including a showing that a particular 
defendant manufactured the product which injured a particular plaintiff. 
Indeed, in the arena of toxic torts, courts have relaxed the requirement of 
cause-in-fact in only two major groups of lawsuits over the last forty 
years.182 In the first, the so-called “DES cases,” girls whose mothers 
of whether her failure to act was the result of duress. See, e.g., United States v. 
Webb, 747 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1984). 
177 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Envtl. Health, Lead Exposure in 
Children: Prevention, Detection, and Management, 116 PEDIATRICS 1036, 1037 
(2005). 
178 Percival, supra note 108, at 38; Deborah W. Denno, Considering Lead 
Poisoning as a Criminal Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.. 377, 396 (1993); 
CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 166, at 139-40.  
179 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Envtl. Health, supra note 177, at 1037. 
180 Thomas Miceli et al., Protecting Children from Lead-Based Paint Poisoning: 
Should Landlords Bear the Burden?, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1995). 
181 John S. Gray & Richard O. Faulk, “Negligence in the Air?” Should 
“Alternative Liability” Theories Apply in Lead Paint Litigation?, 25 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 147, 169-70 (2008). 
182 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), was a lawsuit 
brought by young women who developed a signature form of cancer after their 
mothers had ingested DES during pregnancy. Although the plaintiffs were 
unable to identify the particular defendant who had manufactured the DES 
prescribed to their mothers, the California Supreme Court permitted the case to 
go forward using a “market share” theory, allocating liability under a novel 
theory of joint and several liability. See Gifford, supra note 106, at 878, 902-08 
(describing court’s analysis in Sindell and market share liability more 
generally). The foundation for the plaintiffs’ case was laid in Summers v. Tice, 
199 P.2d 1, 2-5 (Cal. 1948), in which the California Supreme Court held that 
when a plaintiff was injured by the actions of one of two defendants, both of 
whom created a risk of harm to him by shooting in his direction, both 
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took a prescription drug, DES, while pregnant developed a signature 
form of cancer that rendered them infertile. Although the plaintiffs were, 
in many cases, unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the DES 
taken by their mothers, the California Supreme Court, and others 
following it, permitted plaintiffs to recover against a group of 
manufacturers, apportioning liability based on the manufacturers’ 
“market share.”183 In the other case, which involved veterans and their 
family members injured by Agent Orange, a chemical defoliant used 
widely during the Vietnam War, the court approved a class action 
settlement against multiple chemical manufacturers and the United 
States government that provided damages to the plaintiffs following the 
same pattern of market share liability.184 Other cases in which courts 
have used innovative approaches to causation include Rutherford v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc.185 and the Brooklyn Navy Shipyard Litigation.186 
Until its ban in 1978, lead-based paint was widely manufactured, 
sold, and used in the United States despite widespread knowledge of its 
toxicity, due largely to the lead pigment industry’s lobbying and media 
strategies.187 Today there are many potential defendants in lead paint 
poisoning cases: they are the owners of aged and dilapidated buildings 
who have failed to properly maintained them. These substandard 
dwelling units are concentrated in the Midwest and Northeastern United 
States. In most cases it is impossible to determine which manufacturer is 
responsible for the particular paint ingested.188 Lawyers representing 
children injured by lead paint have been largely unable to persuade 
courts that they should relax the requirement of individually attributable 
causation, as was done in both the DES and Agent Orange cases. In only 
one case, Thomas v. Mallett,189 has a state’s highest court permitted a 
suit to go forward against the manufacturers of lead-based paint and 
defendants would be jointly and severally liable for the harm caused to plaintiff, 
unless either could completely exonerate himself. 
183 Id.  
184 In the Agent Orange Litigation, the plaintiff class encompassed Vietnam 
veterans and members of their families, who commenced actions against various 
chemical companies who, in turn, served third-party complaints against the 
United States. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982). The case is discussed at length by Gifford, supra note 106, at 
878.  
185 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997). 
186 971 F.2d 831, 836 (2d Cir. 1994). Both Brooklyn Navy Shipyard and 
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois are discussed in Gifford, supra note 106, at 899 
and 908-09, respectively. 
187 Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, “Cater to the Children”: The Role of the 
Lead Industry in a Public Health Tragedy, 1900-1955, 90 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 
36, 36-43 (2000).  
188 Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 559, 562-65 (Wis. 2005). 
189 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005). 
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paint pigments containing lead using the same risk contribution theory it 
applied in a DES case.190 In contrast, several state and federal courts 
have rejected the use of market share or risk contribution theories against 
lead industry manufacturers,191 as well as innovative actions under 
public nuisance theory to seek money damages to pay for the enormous 
costs of cleaning up lead paint in ramshackle housing.192  
In some relatively rare cases, plaintiffs have succeeded in holding 
individual landlords responsible for causing harm to children who can 
prove that they were injured by their ingestion and inhalation of peeling 
paint and lead dust in run-down housing.193 Despite the clear evidence 
of lead’s potential for harm, in many cases defendants’ lawyers have 
declined to admit responsibility and have resisted liability based on 
causation.194 A typical defense tactic is to concede that lead-based paint 
can cause the type of injuries alleged but assert that in the particular 
case, the plaintiff’s cognitive deficits and behavioral problems are his 
mother’s fault and attributable to her genetic make-up, which she has 
passed along to her child, poor parenting skills, or other environmental 
factors for which the landlord is not responsible.195 Resisting the 
application of the eggshell-plaintiff rule, which holds that a defendant 
190 Id. at 559-65. However, the plaintiff was unsuccessful at trial. Thomas v. 
Mallett, 795 N.W.2d 62 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming jury verdict in 
defendants’ favor). 
191 See Gifford, supra note 106, at 900-08, especially n.133, citing cases. 
192 See, e.g., State v. Lead Industries Assoc., Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 451 (R.I. 2008) 
(noting especially the lack of proximate cause to support a claim of harm); In re 
Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484, 486 (N.J. 2007). 
193 Virginia McGee Richards & Ben A. Hagood, Jr., Hazardous House: 
Obligations and Remedies After Discovering Lead-Based Paint, S.C. LAW., May 
2006, at 28, 30-33; see also Donald G. Gifford & Paolo Pasicolan, Market Share 
Liability Beyond DES Cases: The Solution to the Causation Dilemma in Lead 
Paint Litigation?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 115, 127 (discussing a variety of legal and 
insurance obstacles to holding landlords liable). Under applicable federal law, 
the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4852(d), 
litigation focuses primarily on the failure to disclose the presence of lead-based 
paint, and permits buyers and lessees to seek compensation for the costs of 
clean-up, rather than encompassing compensation for the health consequences 
of failing to clean-up the property. Richards & Hagood, supra, at 30, 33.  
194 CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 166, at 141-46.  
195 Id. at 139-53 (citing cases); see, e.g., Van Epps v. Cnty. of Albany, 706 
N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (noting “a growing trend amongst the defense bar in lead 
injury cases to seek intelligence quotient (I.Q.) examinations and the medical, 
educational and employment records of non-parties and siblings, in order to 
dispute causation or to limit damages” (citing Hope Viner Samborn, Blame It on 
the Bloodline, Discovery of Nonparties’ Medical and Psychiatric Records Is 
Latest Defense Tactic in Disputing Causation, 85 A.B.A. J. 28 (1999); Jennifer 
Wriggins, Genetics, IQ Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in 
Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025 (1997))).  
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takes the injured party as it finds him,196 these landlords seek to switch 
the focus of the narrative from the dilapidated condition of their rental 
premises to the mother. Their lawyers attempt to tilt the litigation playing 
field against the plaintiff, frequently seeking extensive pre-trial 
discovery about the intellectual abilities and achievements of the 
plaintiff’s family members (especially the mother).197 In some cases, 
landlords have been successful in persuading the trial court to order the 
mother or siblings to provide their own school records and to submit to 
IQ tests.198 Here, the potential for both judge and jury to make decisions 
based on their stereotypes of inner-city children of color and their 
mothers is both obvious and dangerous.199 Once again, mothers can be 
blamed for harm to their children, overlooking the substantial 
contributions of other, more distant but powerful, sources of harm. 
Because of the American legal system’s historical preference for a 
single, simple cause of harm, it is easy for children who have been 
injured due to lead exposure not to receive adequate compensation for 
that harm. Although some states, like Massachusetts, have moved 
aggressively to reduce children’s exposure to lead through the enactment 
of precautionary legislation, in other states, government has been slow to 
move to prevent lead exposure, and almost all states limit the legal 
remedies available to children. In many states the economic interests of 
property owners receive greater protection than children.200 
Finally, in contrast to the limited legal remedies and extended 
medical and legal struggles facing inner-city children with high levels of 
lead in their bodies, we might consider the enormous public outcry over 
196 CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 166, at 141; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §31. Under 
the eggshell plaintiff rule, when a plaintiff’s injuries are greater than anticipated, 
due in part to the plaintiff’s preexisting condition, the defendant will be held 
liable for the entire extent of the injuries assuming the other elements of the tort 
are satisfied. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 166, at 121. 
197 See also CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 166, at 145-46, and sources 
cited in supra note 192; cf. Parker v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore, 742 A.2d 522, 
523-25 (Md. Ct. App. 1999) (declaring that while a trial court could not order a 
non-party (a child’s mother) to submit to a mental examination, it could 
condition her ability to testify on submitting to the same examination).  
198 CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 166, at 139-53 (citing cases). But see 
Andon v. 302-304 Mott St. Assocs., 731 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 2000) (upholding the 
mid-level appellate court’s exercise of discretion to reverse a trial court order 
compelling the mother of a child allegedly injured by ingestion of lead in the 
defendant landlord’s apartment as being based on speculative arguments of the 
landlord and unduly intrusive).  
199 CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 166, at 148-53 (detailing the flawed 
reasoning underlying the discovery requests, and the racial and gender bias 
inherent in it).  
200 Cf. Richards & Hagood, supra note 193, at 29-33. 
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lead exposure from toys, especially those imported from China. Not only 
did Congress act swiftly to meet this perceived threat,201 but at least one 
court has ordered medical monitoring in a lawsuit alleging negligent 
manufacturing of toys to ensure that children who may have been injured 
from exposure to those toys will have their health status regularly 
investigated.202 For this group of children, it appears that the 
precautionary principle has been successfully invoked. 
C. SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AS A BASIS FOR 
GOVERNMENT ACTION  
Producers of lead, toxic environmental conditions, and other distant 
contributors to the poor health of America’s children often escape legal 
accountability. This is due in large part to America’s skepticism about 
the precautionary principle, which in turn is both a legacy of laissez-faire 
capitalism and reflective of America’s cultural and legal devotion to the 
ideal of individual responsibility. However, in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, a brief burst of environmental activism successfully challenged 
the conventional wisdom about the proper role of government in 
safeguarding the public’s health. During that decade, environmental law 
expanded rapidly beyond its common law roots203 to a robust statutory 
realm.204 The genius of American environmental lawyers was to 
acknowledge the limits of common law remedies and to push for the 
enactment of statutes based on the precautionary principle—to prevent, 
rather than simply ameliorate, health-related harms.  
In the heady days of the late 1960s to the early 1970s, Congress 
enacted, and President Nixon signed, more than thirty statutes designed 
to protect the population’s health.205 Many of these statutes invoked the 
precautionary principle, permitting a regulator to act before harm 
occurred.206 In response, there was significant debate about how much 
201 Gips, supra note 42, at 545, 548, 580-81.  
202 See, e.g., In re Mattel, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1117-20 (C.D. Cal. 2008).  
203 For the ruminations of this paragraph I am indebted to ROBERT V. PERCIVAL 
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 178-96 (5th 
ed. 2006). See also Percival, supra note 108. 
204 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., A Short Historical Sketch of the Evolution of U.S. 
Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND 
SOCIETY 3, 3 (4th ed. 2010). 
205 Id.; Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the 
Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599, 
2605 (2002). 
206 The precise contours of the precautionary principle are not well-defined. The 
concept has roots in the German notion of “Vorsorgeprinzip,” which could be 
translated simply as “foresight planning” but also “‘combines notions of 
foresight and taking care with those of good husbandry and best practice.’” 
Percival, supra note 108, at 23-24. The precautionary principle first gained 
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risk must be demonstrated before an administrative agency, such as the 
EPA or OSHA, could act to prevent harm. In many cases, the people 
resolving this question were federal judges. Like other decisionmakers, 
these judges also brought their personal biases, political philosophies, 
math and science phobias, and social identities to the process of 
perceiving, assessing, and managing risk.  
In the 1970s, some federal judges were willing to defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of its statutory mandate and permit regulatory 
action despite a lack of definitive proof of a causal link between a 
specific type of pollution and harm to the public. A seminal case was 
Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency.207 Under the Clean Air 
Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was authorized to limit 
airborne emissions of toxic chemicals if the EPA Administrator 
determined that such emissions “will endanger the public health or 
welfare.”208 Based on the available evidence, which showed a strong 
potential for children to be exposed to toxic levels of lead due to high 
lead levels in the atmosphere, the EPA determined to phase out lead in 
gasoline. In that case, Judge J. Skelly Wright interpreted the “will 
endanger” provision of the Clean Air Act expansively, upholding the 
EPA’s decision.209 Essentially, Judge Wright determined that the EPA did 
not need to wait for dead bodies before regulating.210 “[E]ndanger,” he 
international environmental recognition in the Rio Declaration of 1992, which 
stated as a basic principle that “‘[w]here there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’” 
Id. at 21, 81 n.1. See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Paralyzing Principle, REG.,  
Winter 2002-2003, at 32, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/ 
regv25n4/v25n4-9.pdf (arguing against the “strong” version of the 
precautionary principle as potentially leading to paralysis and/or an 
overinvestment of scarce resources, as well as lacking the ability to indicate a 
precise regulatory action). 
207 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).  
208 Id. (interpreting § 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, focusing on the 
meaning of “will endanger”).  
209 Id. at 5. Judge Wright found that there was ample evidence of the harmful 
effects of lead vel non, although there was great dispute about whether the lead 
in gasoline, emitted through combustion in the automobile engine, was the 
cause of higher levels of lead in the blood of adults and children. Judge Wright 
noted, “The reasons for concern are obvious (and essentially undisputed by 
petitioners [opponents of the regulation]): (1) lead in high concentrations in the 
body is toxic; (2) lead can be absorbed into the body from the ambient air; and 
(3) lead particulate emissions from gasoline engines account for approximately 
90 percent of the lead in our air. Despite these apparent reasons for concern, 
hard proof of any danger caused by lead automotive emissions has been hard to 
come by. Part of the reason for this lies in the multiple sources of human 
exposure to lead.” Id. at 8. 
210 Cf. id. at 11-13. 
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said, “means something less than actual harm. When one is endangered, 
harm is threatened; no actual injury need ever occur.”211 Relying on this 
understanding of Congressional intent in its choice of language in the 
Clean Air Act, the majority opinion held that even though the EPA could 
not demonstrate specific actual harm—either that a significant portion of 
the population had very high lead levels or that lead from gasoline was 
the cause of those high levels—the agency had established a significant 
risk of harm. The court reached its decision based on facts showing risk: 
the acknowledged toxicity of high lead levels, the fact that ninety percent 
of the lead in the ambient air came from leaded gas, and that people 
living in urban areas, especially children, were likely to have greater 
exposure to lead.212 This significant risk of harm was sufficient to justify 
precautionary regulation, and was, in Judge Wright’s view, demanded by 
the statute.213  
Only a few years later, this expansive approach to regulation was 
halted in significant part by Justice Stevens’ opinion in the “benzene 
case,” Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute.214 Arguably reflecting his preference for a demonstration of 
causation which was more consistent with common law requirements 
than a Congressional enactment,215 Justice Stevens interpreted the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act to mean that before the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) could establish 
a new, lower permissible exposure level for workers exposed to benzene, 
a potent carcinogen, OSHA must demonstrate that current exposure 
levels represented a “significant risk of harm,” which could only be 
remedied by lowering exposure to another specific level.216 Since the 
benzene case, federal regulatory agencies have generally chosen to 
utilize more quantitative forms of risk analysis, even though this 
approach often relies on subjective policy choices about which 
quantitative approach or “conservative assumptions” to adopt.217 At the 
same time, Congress and many state legislatures have backed away from 
their earlier enthusiasm for the precautionary principle, leaving major 
environmental and public health problems to be addressed through 
litigation, which is often insufficient to protect the public from 
significant environmental risks. Litigation has proved an inadequate 
substitute for legislation, due to the problems faced in identifying 
appropriate defendants and establishing causation,218 the time-
211 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
212 Id. at 8-9, 44-48. 
213 Id. at 13-17. 
214 448 U.S. 607 (1980).  
215 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 183-96. 
216 448 U.S. at 639-43. 
217 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 203, at 195-96. 
218 See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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consuming and expensive nature of litigation, and, most importantly, the 
fact that litigation does not prevent harm but can only provide after-the-
fact recompense, which may have a deterrent effect but only over the 
long run. 
Today, the expansive 1970s approach to preventing harm has largely 
been relegated to an historical footnote, due to narrow judicial 
interpretations of precautionary statutes and substantial pushback from 
political and economic conservatives that has affected decisions of 
Congress and the courts. Although there is mounting evidence that a 
wide range of chemicals, including heavy metals like mercury and 
endocrine disruptors like BPA and phthalates, may cause harm during 
prenatal development as well as after birth, neither Congress nor federal 
agencies have proved willing to act aggressively to protect children’s 
health from these threats.219  
CONCLUSION 
The current myopic focus on mothers as the primary source of harm 
to children stems from the psychological and cultural factors that shape 
our perception of risk. The way we construct risk is facilitated by 
American law, which relies on an elastic concept of the reasonable 
person, simplistic views of causation, and a failure to acknowledge the 
need for systemic precautionary action to prevent potential harms from 
materializing. Only by moving beyond a focus on individuals, especially 
mothers, as the source of risk and taking a broader view of the multiple 
contributors to children’s health can we provide an environment in which 
all children can thrive. 
219 See, e.g., Donna S. Eng et al., Bisphenol A and Chronic Disease Risk Factors 
in US Children, 132 PEDIATRICS e637, e638, e641-43 (2013); Leonardo 
Trasande et al., Association Between Urinary Bisphenol A Concentration and 
Obesity Prevalence in Children and Adolescents, 308 JAMA 1113, 1118-20 
(2012); U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, CASE STUDIES IN ENVTL. MED. (CSEM), 
Course WB 2089, at 24, 44-47, 58-59 (2012). 
                                                     
